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I   INTRODUCTION 
Commentators in the United States and elsewhere have bemoaned a supposed 
decrease in the stigma attached to filing for bankruptcy,1 and have argued that 
this decrease correlated with increasing rates of bankruptcy. In the United States, 
a belief that debtors were abusing the bankruptcy system, and that ‘the shame and 
stigma associated with bankruptcy had been eroded’ was the catalyst for major 
amendments to bankruptcy legislation 2  designed to ‘ferret out the abusers’. 3 
Studies on the incidence of bankruptcy stigma over time, in the United States, 
have reached different conclusions, but more recent qualitative studies have 
confirmed that, for at least some percentage of the bankrupt population, stigma 
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1  See Rafael Efrat, ‘The Evolution of Bankruptcy Stigma’ (2006) 7 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 365, 380; 
Yvana L B H Mols, ‘Bankruptcy Stigma and Vulnerability: Questioning Autonomy and Structuring 
Resilience’ (2012) 29 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 289, 308. 
2  Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub L No 109–8, 119 Stat 23, 
amending Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC (2013).  
3  Michael D Sousa, ‘Bankruptcy Stigma: A Socio-Legal Study’ (2013) 87 American Bankruptcy Law 
Journal 435, 437. 
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and shame remain associated with bankruptcy.4 In this context, stigma signifies 
‘an undesired differentness’5 from the expected social norm. 
In Australia, bankruptcy debates have often reiterated concerns about 
bankruptcy being ‘too easy’ and no longer having shame or a stigma  
associated with it. 6  The response has often been to make bankruptcy more 
difficult or more onerous. One policy decision that reflects this approach was  
the removal, from 2003, of the opportunity introduced in 1992 for some  
debtors to seek early discharge from bankruptcy.7 For example, the explanatory 
memorandum supporting this change argued that  
[t]hese provisions are most often cited as the cause of concern that bankruptcy is 
too easy. The reduced period of bankruptcy is seen to discourage debtors from 
trying to enter formal or informal arrangements with their creditors to settle debts, 
and provides little opportunity for debtors to become better financial managers.8 
Despite this concern with the ‘ease’ of bankruptcy, there is little empirical 
evidence about the extent or impact of bankruptcy stigma in Australia; a 1995 
monograph is one exception, but the data it relies upon is now more than 25 years 
old.9 
This issue of stigma associated with bankruptcy has a long heritage in  
both the common law and civil law legal systems.10 Such stigma has a social 
dimension – in particular affecting relationships with family and friends. A 
seminal British law reform report on insolvency in the 1980s, the Cork Report, 
referred to one result of bankruptcy as ‘a sense of failure and humiliation … with 
[his] family or [his] colleagues at work’ which must be aggravated if there is a 
                                                 
4  Ibid 481. See also Deborah Thorne and Leon Anderson, ‘Managing the Stigma of Personal Bankruptcy’ 
(2006) 39 Sociological Focus 77, 93; Teresa A Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 
‘Less Stigma or More Financial Distress: An Empirical Analysis of the Extraordinary Increase in 
Bankruptcy Filings’ (2006) 59 Stanford Law Review 213, 214–15 who report in the third of three 
comparable empirical observations of individual bankruptcy spread over 20 years that  
[t]he data we present are not consistent with the claim that declining bankruptcy stigma has fuelled an 
increase in bankruptcy filings. Instead, the data are far more consistent with the hypothesis that increased 
filings result from increased financial distress, and they hint that, despite loud claims to the contrary, the 
stigma of bankruptcy may actually be increasing. 
5  Martin Ryan, ‘The Stigma of Bankruptcy’ [1992] (Spring) Socio-Legal Bulletin 6, 6 citing Erving 
Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity (Penguin, 1968) 13, 15. 
6  John Duns, Insolvency: Law and Policy (Oxford University Press, 2002) 171.  
7  John King, ‘Moving beyond the “Hard”–“Easy” Tug of War: A Historical, Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Bankruptcy Discharge’ (2004) 28 Melbourne University Law Review 654, 656.  
8  Explanatory Memorandum, Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 2002 (Cth) [42].  
9  Martin Ryan, The Last Resort: A Study of Consumer Bankrupts (Avebury, 1995) 83, 88. 
10  Efrat, above n 1; ‘Declaring oneself unable to manage one’s obligations has for centuries signalled a sort 
of social and economic death in many parts of the world, and such connotations are difficult to 
overcome’: Jason J Kilborn et al, ‘Report on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons’ (Report 
No ACS6818, Working Group on the Treatment of the Insolvency of Natural Persons, World Bank, 1 
January 2014) 44 [122] <http://documents.worldbank.oeeRrg/curated/en/2014/01/18836883/world-
working-group-treatment-insolvency-natural-persons> (‘World Bank Report’). 
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public examination and press publicity.11 More recently a World Bank report in 
2014 on insolvency and natural persons cited surveys of debtors in many well-
established insolvency systems that revealed ‘pervasive and profound feelings of 
guilt, shame, and stigma’.12 Bankruptcy stigma also has an economic aspect – 
affecting a bankrupt as an economic player, whether in seeking employment, 
credit (eg to operate a business as a sole trader) or positions of responsibility. In 
fact, a frequent advantage trumpeted for entering formal arrangements with 
creditors is that debtors avoid the stigma of bankruptcy and the limitations 
imposed on bankrupts.13 
The Australian insolvency regime reflects this stigma associated with 
personal bankruptcy.14 In a leading High Court decision on the importance of 
strict compliance with the statutory requirements for Bankruptcy Notices, 15 
Deane J referred to the many ‘honest, albeit unbusinesslike or naive, people’ for 
whom bankruptcy ‘represents a pronouncement of failure and humiliation 
attended by the fear of unknown consequences and the susceptibility to criminal 
punishment for what would otherwise be innocent conduct’.16 
While the literature also refers to bankruptcy becoming more accepted and 
more frequent, commentators have noted that bankruptcy ‘still retains some 
moral and social stigma’.17 In Wharton v Official Receiver in Bankruptcy18 when 
dealing with an objection to discharge from bankruptcy, Weinberg J noted that 
‘[e]ven in this day and age bankruptcy carries a measure of stigma. It can be 
traumatic for the bankrupt and for the bankrupt’s family and associates’.19 
The label of ‘bankrupt’ for an individual is seen to be morally reprehensible 
in a society and economy such as Australia that relies so heavily on the extension 
                                                 
11  Additional likely results of bankruptcy noted were a degree of disruption of family life; some inescapable 
intrusion into the privacy of the home; the family dwelling itself is in peril; and the recording of the 
bankruptcy with a credit reference agency to the detriment of the future ability to obtain work and credit: 
United Kingdom Insolvency Law Review Committee, Report on Insolvency Law and Practice, Cmnd 
8558 (1982) 55–6 (‘Cork Report’).  
12  Kilborn et al, above n 10, 43 [120]. 
13  In the Australian context, see Paul McQuade and Patrick Hay, Thomson Reuters, Bankruptcy in 
Australia: A Guidebook (at Update 52) [31.105]; Michael Murray, CCH Australia, Australian Insolvency 
Management Practice Commentary (at 25 April 2015) [2.040], [24.150]. It is noted that, as with 
bankruptcy, the alternatives are reported on the National Personal Insolvency Index. 
14  Unlike the United States and the United Kingdom, the regulation of insolvency in Australia is bifurcated 
between individual and corporate insolvencies. Collective insolvency proceedings for individuals are 
primarily subject to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) and corporate insolvencies to the Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth). This bifurcation of insolvency law between individual (or natural person) debtors and 
corporate debtors has resulted in separate regulatory bodies for personal and corporate insolvency 
administrations and practitioners. 
15  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 41. The most common basis for a creditor presenting a petition for an 
involuntary bankruptcy is noncompliance with a bankruptcy notice. 
16  Kleinwort Benson Australia Ltd v Crowl (1988) 165 CLR 71, 82 (Deane J).  
17  Michael Murray and Jason Harris, Keay’s Insolvency: Personal and Corporate Law and Practice 
(Lawbook, 8th ed, 2014) 32 [2.08]. 
18  (2001) 107 FCR 28. 
19  Ibid 36 [38].  
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of credit and its repayment (with interest) for the wheels of commerce to turn.20 
The notion of a debtor ‘failing’ to discharge his or her financial commitments can 
bring with it the suspicion that the debtor cannot be trusted to meet their 
obligations in general.21 At the very least, it may be evidence that they have likely 
not met their contractual promises.22 
The issue of bankruptcy stigma has more recently been raised in the 
Australian Government’s Productivity Commission Draft Report on Business 
Set-Up, Transfer and Closure. This draft report recommends that the period of 
bankruptcy prior to discharge should be reduced from three years to one year, 
with the trustee and courts retaining the power to extend the period to a 
maximum of eight years.23 The rationale is to ‘help reduce the stigma attached to 
bankruptcy, and encourage entrepreneurs to start new businesses, while still 
preserving regulatory oversight to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process’.24 
Research on the relationship between bankruptcy and entrepreneurship has 
shown that stigmatisation is seen ‘as an important contributor to permanent exits 
from entrepreneurial careers after bankruptcy’.25 However, it is notable that, in 
Australia at least, the majority of bankruptcies are non-business bankruptcies,26 
thus the objective of facilitating entrepreneurship may be less relevant for many 
people who enter bankruptcy. 
Sociologists investigating the phenomenon of ‘stigma’ have identified a 
range of ways in which an individual’s behaviour ‘deviates’ from the social norm 
results in labelling – by others in an official or informal way as well as by the 
person themselves as a form of self-labelling. One area where such ‘labelling’ of 
bankrupts has the potential to adversely affect individuals is in their ability to 
                                                 
20  ‘The function of stigma is to bolster the dominant economic and social order’: Robert M Page, Stigma 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984). 
21  Michael Quilter refers to approbation being attached to ‘the financial failure that is behind the stigma’ 
rather than to the bankruptcy itself: Michael Quilter, ‘Bankruptcy and Order’ (2013) 39 Monash 
University Law Review 188, 211. 
22  It is possible that the financial obligations which gave rise to the bankruptcy arose because of a failure to 
meet statutory obligations (such as failure by directors to prevent their company trading whilst insolvent) 
or to meet obligations under tort law. However that is likely a small proportion of the individuals who are 
made bankrupt each year in Australia. 
23  In Canada also, discharge from bankruptcy is referred to in terms of restoring individuals to productivity: 
Stephanie Ben-Ishai, ‘Discharge’ in Stephanie Ben-Ishai and Anthony Duggan (eds), Canadian 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: Bill C-55, Statute c 47 and Beyond (LexisNexis, 2007) 370.  
24  Productivity Commission, Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure (Draft Report, 21 May 2015) 25 
(‘Draft Report on Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure’). 
25  Ingrid Wakkee, Frank Dorrestein and Paula Englis, ‘The Stigmatization of Bankrupt Entrepreneurs in 
Dutch Newspapers’ (2015) Journal of Small Business & Entrepreneurship 1, 4. On the cultural context of 
stigma and entrepreneurial risk-taking and whether individualistic cultures may be more tolerant to the 
stigma of failure than collectivistic cultures, see Naga Lakshmi Damaraju, Jay Barney and Gregory Dess, 
‘Stigma and Entrepreneurial Risk Taking’ (Paper presented at the Summer Conference 2010 – Opening 
Up Innovation: Strategy, Organization and Technology, Imperial College London Business School, 16–
18 June 2010). 
26  In the June 2015 quarter, 22.1 per cent of bankruptcies were business related: Australian Financial 
Security Authority, Commentary: June Quarter 2015 <https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/statistics/ 
provisional-business-and-non-business-personal-insolvency-statistics/quarterly-statistics/commentary-
june-quarter-2015>. 
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engage or re-engage in the workforce. Australian law currently countenances and 
indeed reinforces in a number of ways the continuance of bankruptcy stigma in 
employment and equivalent engagement in the workforce.27 
First, there are numerous professions and trades where legislation or 
regulation provides that a bankruptcy or other insolvency administration is a bar 
to employment. In some cases, this bar exists only for the period of bankruptcy, 
but in others it can extend to some of the period after discharge from bankruptcy. 
Second, there are some professions and trades where a bankruptcy or insolvency 
administration is required by legislation or regulation to be disclosed to the 
employer or professional body. Third, bankruptcy and other insolvency 
administrations are matters that are required by legislation to be recorded on the 
National Personal Insolvency Index (‘NPII’); this is a permanent public register, 
accessible to any person (including existing or potential employers) on payment 
of a fee. 
Each of these matters can potentially result in adverse employment outcomes 
for an individual who is, or has been, bankrupt (or, in some cases, a party to 
another insolvency administration). Further, there is no prohibition on employers 
or prospective employers using insolvency information to make decisions 
adverse to such a person. 
This article therefore explores the extent to which Australian laws (across all 
jurisdictions: federal, state and territory); regulations; and professional and 
licensing rules reinforce the stigma associated with bankruptcy and so affect the 
future employment prospects of bankrupts and former bankrupts. Although there 
are three primary personal insolvency administrations provided for in the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (bankruptcy, debt agreement, and personal insolvency 
agreement), the focus of this article is on bankruptcy, as it is the option that 
encompasses the greatest restrictions, and is also the most commonly used 
option.28  In addition, it is likely that stigma is more closely associated with 
bankruptcy than with the other personal insolvency administrations.29 
Part II of this article provides a brief overview of literature on stigma and its 
relevance for the status of being or having been a bankrupt. Part III follows with 
clear examples where labelling of bankrupts facilitates stigmatisation when 
seeking employment or engaging in the workforce, for example, as a sole trader 
or in a business partnership. In some examples, the restrictions only apply to 
undischarged bankrupts; while for other examples, the restrictions extend into a 
period after discharge from bankruptcy. 
                                                 
27  For example, a tradesperson engaging as a subcontractor providing services. 
28  Provisional statistics show that there were 17 163 bankruptcies, 10 911 debt agreements, and 214 
personal insolvency agreements in 2014–15: Australian Financial Security Authority, Annual Statistics 
2014–15, <https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/statistics/provisional-bankruptcy-and-personal-insolvency-
statistics/annual-statistics/annual-statistics-2014-15>.  
29  In his second reading speech for the Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 1996, the then Attorney-
General expressed the view that entering into a debt agreement would ‘avoid the stigma that bankruptcy 
entails’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 June 1996, 2828 (Daryl 
Williams). 
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In light of the evidence in Part III, Part IV puts forward arguments as to why 
the reinforcement of bankruptcy stigma matters and can adversely affect, for 
inadequately stated policy reasons, the negative characteristics associated with 
being a current or former bankrupt. In Part V, the article makes some suggestions 
for change through law reform – in order to promote the fresh start objective of 
Australia’s bankruptcy system as well as its wider rehabilitative effect and so 
increase the likelihood that a former bankrupt will be able to engage or re-engage 
as an economic actor in Australian society, and improve their financial 
wellbeing. 
 
II   STIGMA AND BANKRUPTCY 
‘Stigma’ has been defined as ‘an attribute that is deeply discrediting’ and ‘an 
undesired differentness’30 from the expected social norm. In his seminal work, 
Goffman viewed stigma as ‘a process based on the social construction of 
identity’.31 The social status of people associated with a stigmatised condition 
moves from a ‘normal’ status to a ‘discredited’ or ‘discreditable’ social status.32 
‘Discredited’ stigmas are overt and easily identified by others upon encounter, 
such as a physical disability (leprosy) or social disability (obesity), whereas 
‘discreditable’ stigmas are not noticeable to others, but could become known, 33 
such as a criminal background or mental illness. Bankruptcy is one such form of 
discreditable stigma.34 
At law, bankruptcy effects a change in status, initiating a collective 
proceeding rather than inter partes litigation.35 As Allsop J stated in Labocus 
Precious Metals Pty Ltd v Thomas36 when referring to the public and private 
importance of this change of status: 
[Bankruptcy] is not a matter merely between debtor and creditor. It affects 
creditors generally and the public. The bankrupt, while bankrupt, has his or her 
status changed. Conduct which might otherwise be innocent may become 
punishable at law. There remains a stigma to the person, often as a mark of failure 
in life, sometimes of a particularly humiliating character.37 
A person’s legal status as a bankrupt also carries with it implications for their 
social or personal status: ‘The stigmatised are likely to have to confront the issue 
                                                 
30  Ryan, ‘The Stigma of Bankruptcy’, above n 5, 6 citing Erving Goffman, Stigma (Penguin, 1968) 13, 15. 
31  Arthur Kleinman and Rachel Hall-Clifford, ‘Stigma: A Social, Cultural and Moral Process’ (2009) 63 
Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health 418. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Ryan, ‘The Stigma of Bankruptcy’, above n 5, 6. 
34  Ibid 7; Thorne and Anderson, above n 4; Sousa, above n 3. The extent to which bankruptcy causes a 
stigma ‘varies across regions and over time due to differences and changes in norms and values which are 
caused by contextual factors such as rules and regulations, demographics and economic circumstances’: 
Wakkee, Dorrestein and Englis, above n 25, 3. 
35  Ahern v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Qld) (1987) 76 ALR 137, 148. It is also quasi-penal and 
imposes certain restrictions on a bankrupt person. 
36  [2007] FCA 1154. 
37  Ibid [53]. 
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of whether they will be accepted for what they are or will their stigmas become 
master statuses which others heavily emphasise, to the exclusion of other 
characteristics, in dealing with the person.’38 
Bankruptcy has long incurred ‘societal disapproval’ as an indication that an 
individual’s behaviour has deviated from accepted norms or expectations.39 As it 
is not readily observable, bankruptcy is a discreditable stigma, one which people 
may seek to conceal through ‘managing information’.40 Any such attempt to hide 
this change in legal status however is limited by the information that is publicly 
available on bankruptcies41 or by the circumstances where a person is required to 
reveal such information, for example when applying for credit or employment.42 
Some of the key elements identified in sociological research on stigma are 
present in bankruptcy. First, stigma indicates a falling short of what society 
expects and carries with it the notion of ‘deviance’.43 Debtors in default are seen 
as deviants in that they ‘deviate from the rules of society by not repaying their 
debts as they fall due’.44 Bankruptcy has been perceived as ‘deceitful’ and ‘quasi-
criminal’45 and brings with it various ‘penalties’.46 Based on research into the 
history of bankruptcy regulation, Efrat notes an association has long been made 
between bankrupts and criminals.47 As observed in a recent New Zealand High 
Court decision: 
It is unfashionable to label bankruptcy as having a punitive element. There is a 
tendency to flinch from referring to this aspect, perhaps because of a residual 
memory of the Marshalsea Prison when the law provided for the detention of 
bankrupts who could not honour their creditors. Nevertheless it is a fact of life that 
                                                 
38  Ryan, ‘The Stigma of Bankruptcy’, above n 5, 6. Anthropologists refer to the moral status of a 
stigmatised person: ‘The moral standing of an individual or group is determined by their local social 
world, and maintaining moral status is dependent on meeting social obligations and norms. Individuals 
with (or associated with) stigmatised conditions are de facto unable to meet these requirements’: 
Kleinman and Hall-Clifford, above n 31.  
39  Sousa, above n 3, 436 citing Gerhard Falk, Stigma: How We Treat Outsiders (Prometheus Books, 2001) 
17. Michael Quilter refers to ‘social stigma’ connected to ‘a lack of financial acumen’ as well as the 
characterisation of bankrupts historically and currently as ‘fraudulent, untrustworthy, careless, immoral, 
lacking in character, disrespectful’: Michael Quilter, ‘Development of Bankruptcy Process in the Late 
Republic and Its Relationship to Modern Bankruptcy’ (2013) 21 Insolvency Law Journal 125, 139.  
40  Ryan, The Last Resort, above n 9, 61. 
41  This information is published in the National Personal Insolvency Index: see Bankruptcy Regulations 
1966 (Cth) sch 8, discussed below. In the American context, companies that notify residents about 
neighbours who have filed for bankruptcy and for a fee provide information taken from court records: see 
Thorne and Anderson, above n 4.  
42  Ryan, ‘The Stigma of Bankruptcy’, above n 5, 9. 
43  Ryan, The Last Resort, above n 9, 60.  
44  Ibid 56.  
45  Efrat, above n 1, 369. Andrew R Keay, Bankruptcy Proceedings Handbook (Longman Professional, 2nd 
ed, 1992) 4: the effect of bankruptcy is still regarded by the courts as ‘quasi-penal’ referring to Re Walsh 
(1982) 47 ALR 751, 753; Re Wheelahan (1982) 58 FLR 91, 97. 
46  Ryan, The Last Resort, above n 9, 56. For example, a person who is an undischarged bankrupt is 
prohibited from managing a corporation: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 206A–206B. Also it is an 
offence for an undischarged bankrupt to travel overseas without their trustee’s consent and conditions 
may be imposed by the trustee: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 272(1)(c), 272(2).  
47  Efrat, above n 1, 371. Christopher Symes and John Duns, Australian Insolvency Law (LexisNexis 
Butterworths, 2009) 16 [2.1.1].  
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bankruptcy has a punitive element. There is a stigma that attaches to bankruptcy. 
It also carries disabilities.48 
An involuntary bankruptcy will require proof of an ‘act of bankruptcy’49 and 
the timing of such acts also establishes the commencement of a bankruptcy, 
relevant to the potential ‘claw back’ of assets into the estate.50 These acts of 
bankruptcy, which are now repealed in the United Kingdom,51 reflect a quasi-
criminal approach to bankruptcy which continues in Australia. They include for 
example, where the bankrupt ‘with intent to defeat or delay his or her creditors’ 
either ‘departs or remains out of Australia’; ‘departs from his or her 
dwelling-house or usual place of business’; ‘otherwise absents himself or 
herself’; or ‘begins to keep house’.52 Also, the pre-bankruptcy conduct of debtors 
is examined following bankruptcy – based on the statement of affairs that must 
be lodged by all bankrupts, 53  and, in certain circumstances, also through a 
private 54  or public 55  examination. These reinforce the concept that, upon 
bankruptcy, a debtor deviates from societal expectations. 
Second, stigma is also associated with ‘labeling theory’56 and the labelling of 
deviant behaviour which leads to a ‘downward placement’ in the social status 
hierarchy.57 There are three categories of ‘labelling’. ‘Official labelling’ occurs 
where an individual experiences stigmatisation from formal societal institutions 
such as through discrimination in employment.58 As the research in the following 
sections shows, while there are no restrictions on employment of bankrupts 
contained in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), there are a number of professions 
and trades that officially label bankrupts through imposing eligibility restrictions 
for membership or licensing. Another aspect of official labelling occurs in that 
bankrupts often have more difficulty obtaining new credit, and if successful are 
subjected to higher rates of interest.59 
‘Informal labeling’ occurs in family, work and friendship groups. Of specific 
relevance to this article is informal labelling in employment and business 
contexts. Our research shows that there are circumstances where bankrupts, while 
not explicitly restricted from certain forms of employment, are required to 
disclose their status as bankrupts with the potential impact on the assessment of 
                                                 
48  Darby v Official Assignee [2013] NZHC 22 (29 January 2013) [22]. 
49  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40.  
50  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 115 and ‘relation back day’.  
51  Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) c 45.  
52  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 40(1)(c). 
53  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 54, 55, 56B, and 57, and on creditor access to this information s 54(4). 
54  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 77C. 
55  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 81. 
56  Sousa, above n 3, 440 citing Stephen C Ainlay, Lerita M Coleman and Gaylene Becker, ‘Stigma 
Reconsidered’ in Stephen C Ainlay, Gaylene Becker and Lerita M Coleman (eds), The Dilemma of 
Difference: A Multidisciplinary View of Stigma (Springer, 1986) 8.  
57  Ibid citing Bruce G Link and Jo C Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma (2001) 27 Annual Review of Sociology 
363, 371.  
58  Ibid 440. 
59  Ibid 445. 
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their suitability for employment. 60  The labelling of a person as a ‘bankrupt’ 
carries with it ‘strong adverse social connotation’ and inflicts ‘penalties and 
discrimination’ on the individual.61 Australian research by Martin Ryan indicated 
that ‘[w]hen there was experienced stigma, it was likely to come from relatives 
and friends rather than others.’62 
The final category is ‘self-labeling’, which ‘may have serious negative 
consequences for an individual, including lessened employment prospects, a 
lower quality of life, and low self-esteem.’63 Sousa observes that ‘bankruptcy 
debtors experience all three forms of labeling, with self-labeling perhaps being 
the harshest consequence of filing for bankruptcy.’ 64  Research undertaken in 
America by Thorne and Anderson found that ‘[f]eelings of stigmatization were a 
pervasive feature of our informants’ bankruptcy experiences.’65 Even discharge 
from bankruptcy does not necessarily provide a fresh start to the debtor with 
certain of the stigma remaining.66 
In 1978, the United States when enacting its new Bankruptcy Code sought to 
‘ameliorate debtors’ attitudes about bankruptcy and society’s attitudes about 
debtors’ through changing the term for filers from ‘bankrupts’ to ‘debtors’.67 The 
new Code also changed the filing of a bankruptcy petition to the seeking of an 
‘order for relief’ and included section 525 to prohibit certain forms of 
discrimination against bankruptcy debtors.68 Examining the issue of debt relief 
from a human rights perspective, Ondersma has observed: 
There are, however, limits to what insolvency can accomplish with respect to 
protecting or restoring debtors’ human dignity. Stigmatization and marginalization 
will likely not be cured in an insolvency system unless the jurisdiction develops a 
method for ensuring that its insolvency system is capable of mitigating the shame 
or stigmatization associated with over-indebtedness or failure to pay debts.69 
In the next Part, we explore the ways in which bankruptcy stigma is enacted 
and entrenched by bankruptcy legislation and other laws in Australia. 
 
                                                 
60  See discussion below on applications to the police service.  
61  Efrat, above n 1, 370, 372.  
62  Ryan, The Last Resort, above n 9, 233; ‘[T]wo respondents commented that they thought they had been 
rejected by potential employers when applying for a job because of their bankruptcy. In both cases, it 
seemed that the employers had conducted credit reference checks without the applicants’ knowledge’ : at 
182. 
63  Sousa, above n 3, 441. 
64  Ibid 444. ‘Stigma’s pervasiveness in bankruptcy has negative psychological effects on the debtor’: Mols, 
above n 1, 295. 
65  Thorne and Anderson, above n 4, 93. 
66  Re Todd; Ex parte Todd [1986] FCA 463 [19] (Lockhart J). 
67  Mols, above n 1, 301. 
68  Sousa, above n 3, 454. 
69  Chrystin Ondersma, ‘A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief’ (2014) 36 University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law 269, 321. 
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III   THE LAW CREATES AND FACILITATES LABELLING AND 
BANKRUPTCY STIGMATISATION IN EMPLOYMENT AND 
BUSINESS 
Stigmatisation of bankruptcy specifically in an employment and business 
context occurs through official labelling and through informal labelling.70 This 
stigmatisation can lead to adverse impacts on the ability of a person who is 
bankrupt, or has previously been bankrupt, to earn an income, and is therefore an 
issue worth examining. This official labelling is explicitly provided for in 
Commonwealth, State and Territory laws; regulations; and professional rules for 
entry into a wide range of occupations; as well as through the Bankruptcy Act 
1966 (Cth) obligation to disclose bankruptcy status in certain circumstances. 
Further, the potential for informal labelling is also facilitated by the 
establishment of the NPII as a permanent and public record of bankruptcy 
administrations, and by the lack of any proscription against using bankruptcy 
information in employment decision-making. 
In this Part of the article, we therefore explore the different ways in which the 
Australian laws create, maintain and reinforce the stigma of bankruptcy, through 
official and informal labelling in the employment and self-employment context. 
Of course, it does not necessarily follow that these laws lack justification, either 
at all, or in particular circumstances71 – we will return to this issue in Part IV 
below. Similarly, it is not necessarily the case that the laws have been designed 
with the object of stigmatisation, but, as we explain below, current laws and 
policies facilitate stigmatisation. 
 
A Official Labelling through the Imposition of Employment Restrictions 
upon Bankrupts and Former Bankrupts 
One way in which the law officially labels people who are, or have been, 
bankrupt is through the imposition of occupational entry restrictions on bankrupts 
or former bankrupts, preventing or limiting the ability of such persons to work in 
numerous occupations and professions. Most of these restrictions are not found in 
the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), but instead are found in industry specific 
legislation, regulations and professional rules at Commonwealth or state/territory 
level. There is not, to our knowledge, a single document or source that identifies 
all of the occupational restrictions imposed on persons who have been bankrupt. 
On this question, the Bankruptcy Regulator, the Australian Financial Security 
Authority (‘AFSA’), has noted the following on its website: 
The Bankruptcy Act 1966 does not impose any restrictions on employment in any 
trades or professions. However, particular industry associations or licensing 
authorities may impose certain restrictions or conditions should a member or 
licensee become bankrupt or enter into an arrangement under the Bankruptcy Act. 
Generally state governments administer legislation that govern eligibility for 
                                                 
70  It is also possible for self-labelling to be present and have adverse effects on employment or business 
outcomes. However, the law plays little role in such labelling. 
71  Murray and Harris, above n 17, [2.08]; Kilborn et al, above n 10, 44 [124]. 
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particular trades (eg builders, plumbers, second hand dealers, etc) while national 
or state based professional associations and/or statutory boards set the eligibility 
requirements for particular professions (eg accountants, lawyers, barristers, tax 
agents, etc).72 
AFSA then provides on its website a list of some trades and professions 
where restrictions may apply, although AFSA notes that this is not a 
comprehensive listing and that if a bankrupt’s trade or profession is not listed 
they should contact the relevant licensing authority or association and make 
further enquiries.73 
We have independently undertaken a survey of the restrictions imposed on 
bankrupts and former bankrupts across the jurisdictions within Australia. The 
complexity of the task is such that this article likewise does not purport to be 
comprehensive; however it does illustrate the range of occupations where official 
labelling of bankruptcy occurs. As noted above, we have focused only on 
restrictions on the grounds of bankruptcy; although in many cases restrictions 
also apply to other personal insolvency administrations. For example, in the case 
of property, stock and business agents in New South Wales (‘NSW’), the 
restriction applies to persons who are, or have been bankrupt, as well as to 
persons who have ‘applied to take the benefit of any law for the relief of 
bankrupt or insolvent debtors’ or ‘made an assignment of his or her remuneration 
for their benefit’.74 This would include entering into a debt agreement or personal 
insolvency agreement as a debtor. 
From our review, we have identified two circumstances where official 
labelling occurs, and has the potential to adversely affect a person’s ability to 
enter an occupation or profession: first, where bankruptcy creates a mandatory 
bar on participation in the occupation for a specified period of time; and second, 
where bankruptcy is a bar on participation in the occupation, but there is some 
discretion in the decision-maker to relax that bar in certain circumstances. These 
categories are discussed further below, with specific examples focusing on 
restrictions to entry. In most of the cases discussed, there is a similarly adverse 
impact if a person becomes bankrupt whilst already a participant in the 
occupation.75 
 
                                                 
72  Australian Financial Security Authority, Employment Restrictions <https://www.afsa.gov.au/debtors/ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-overview/employment-restrictions>. 
73  Ibid. 
74  Property, Stock and Business Agents Act 2002 (NSW) s 16(1A).  
75  See eg, Public Service Act 1999 (Cth) ss 47, 54 under which a Senior Public Servant must be removed 
from office if he or she becomes bankrupt; Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth) s 25 under which 
appointment as an Electoral Commissioner or Deputy Electoral Commissioner is mandatorily terminated 
upon bankruptcy; Commercial Agents and Private Inquiry Agents Act 2004 (NSW) ss 13, 17 under which 
a master licence or operator licence must be cancelled if the licensee becomes bankrupt; Second-Hand 
Vehicle Dealers Act 1995 (SA) s 14B regarding cancellation of a second-hand vehicle dealer’s licence if 
the licensee becomes bankrupt.  
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1 Bankruptcy as a Mandatory Bar to Participation  
Table 1 sets out a number of occupations where there is a mandatory 
exclusion of persons who are or have been bankrupt. Such persons are prevented 
from entering the occupation if the relevant criteria are met. In some cases this 
mandatory exclusion exists only during the period of bankruptcy (that is, whilst 
the person is an undischarged bankrupt); in other cases it has a longer duration 
and extends to a time period after a person has been discharged from bankruptcy. 
There does not appear to be any consistent approach across occupations on this 
issue. 
As Table 1 demonstrates, the range of occupations affected by mandatory 
bars includes company directors and managers; bankruptcy trustees and debt 
agreement administrators; parliamentarians; senior public servants; justices of the 
peace; motor car dealers; property agents; security agents; primary produce 
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2 Previous Bankruptcy as a Discretionary Consideration 
In other cases, a current or previous bankruptcy is not an absolute bar to 
participation. Although bankruptcy is listed as one of a number of factors that 
may impact on eligibility to participate in the occupation, there is scope for some 
discretion on the part of a decision-maker to allow a person who is, or has been, 
bankrupt to enter and remain in that occupation. 
This discretion is expressed in at least two different ways. In some examples, 
bankruptcy is normally a bar but it is possible for an affected person to make an 
application to the decision-maker that the bar should not be applied in their 
particular case, on the grounds that there is some lack of moral culpability in 
relation to the bankruptcy. In other examples, it is a requirement for participation 
in the occupation that the person be a ‘fit and proper person’. A previous 
bankruptcy is a matter that can properly be considered in that assessment of 
whether an applicant is a fit and proper person, but it is not determinative of the 
outcome. 
The range of occupations affected in this way includes manufacturers, 
producers and dealers of excise goods, builders, directors, senior managers and 
auditors in the banking industry, accountants, taxation professionals, valuers, 
members of the legal profession, school teachers, security agents, property 
agents, conveyancers, public servants, and the mining industry. Table 2 provides 
some more details of some of the restrictions applicable in these occupations. As 
with the mandatory exclusions, there is a variation across the restrictions as to 
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In most cases, there is scope for the exercise of this discretion to also be 
challenged by an administrative tribunal and/or by the courts. The following 
discussion of some recent cases in the building industry in Queensland, and in the 
legal profession in NSW, provides an insight into the ways in which 
discretionary powers can be exercised in cases where the applicant is or has been 
bankrupt. However, it is difficult to draw any generally applicable conclusions, 
as these decisions all turn on their individual facts.  
 
a) Queensland Building Industry 
In Queensland, a person who has taken advantage of bankruptcy laws (and 
who would thus normally be ineligible to hold a licence) can apply to the 
Queensland Building and Construction Commission for a declaration that the 
person be treated as a ‘permitted individual’ and thus be eligible for a builder’s 
licence. 77  An applicant can be categorised as a permitted individual for the 
relevant event only if the individual took all reasonable steps to avoid the coming 
into existence of the circumstances that resulted in the happening of the relevant 
event. 78  There are specific matters that must be considered in making this 
assessment, including the extent to which the applicant kept proper books of 
account and financial records; sought appropriate financial or legal advice; and 
made appropriate provision for taxation debts.79 A decision of the Commission to 
reject an application can be reviewed by the Queensland Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal.80 
The approach to be taken by the Tribunal is described in Younan v 
Queensland Building and Services Authority: 81 
The test in s 56AD(8) requires first, the identification of the relevant event; 
second, the identification of the circumstances that resulted in the happening of 
the relevant event; third, a consideration of whether the relevant individual took 
all reasonable steps to avoid those circumstances coming into existence; and, if 
satisfied of that, fourth, a decision whether to categorise the individual as a 
permitted individual. What were reasonable steps depended on what was 
reasonable for the individual concerned in the circumstances in which he found 
himself, with such information as he then had. It is not a question of whether he 
did everything possible to prevent these circumstances from arising, or whether 
they would not have arisen if he had acted differently. The reasonableness of his 
behaviour must be assessed by reference to what was known by him at the time, 
without the benefit of hindsight.82 
This is the approach that was taken in the case of Cashen v Queensland 
Building and Construction Commission.83 In this case, the relevant event was Mr 
                                                 
77  Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) s 56AC. Also note that under s 74B, 
if a licensee is bankrupt or insolvent, that constitutes proper grounds for taking disciplinary action against 
the licensee.  
78  Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) s 56AD(8). 
79  Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) s 56AD(8A). 
80  Queensland Building and Construction Commission Act 1991 (Qld) s 56AH. 
81  [2010] QDC 158. 
82  Ibid [26] (McGill DCJ). 
83  [2014] QCAT 362 (Unreported, Senior Member Oliver, 29 July 2014). 
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Cashen’s entering into bankruptcy. Of the various circumstances that were 
identified as resulting in the happening of the bankruptcy, the Tribunal accepted 
that ‘the catalyst for the financial difficulties ultimately experienced by Mr 
Cashen resulted from his marriage breakdown’. 84  As Mr Cashen’s wife had 
previously assisted him to run the business, the separation had an adverse impact 
on the business,85 and the circumstances that resulted in the bankruptcy were Mr 
Cashen’s ability to solely manage and conduct the business and make payments 
to financiers.86  The Tribunal, however, found that Mr Cashen there was ‘no 
reasonable step that he could take concerning the separation, insofar as it related 
to the conduct of the business’.87 The Tribunal also noted the various steps that 
Mr Cashen did take to address his deteriorating financial position after  
the separation, including seeking advice about marketing the former  
matrimonial home, improving the home as a result of that advice, renting the 
home and residing in cheaper accommodation, seeking approval for a 
refinancing, and seeing advice from professional people about his financial 
situation.88 The Tribunal found that ‘there was little more he could reasonably do 
to avoid the downward financial spiral that led to bankruptcy’,89 and so granted 
the application to be categorised as a permitted person. 
In contrast, in Dancey v Queensland Building Services Authority, 90  the 
Tribunal confirmed the Authority’s decision refusing to categorise Mr Dancey  
as a permitted individual.91 In this case, the relevant event was Mr Dancey’s 
bankruptcy, which in turn had resulted in part from Mr Dancey being unable to 
satisfy personal guarantees that he had given as a director of his company.92 The 
Tribunal was not satisfied that Mr Dancey had taken all reasonable steps to avoid 
the circumstances resulting in his bankruptcy, including because he: 
x did not seek legal and financial advice about the specific terms of a 
substantial loan agreement signed by his company, particularly given that 
the agreement entailed more financial risk to the company than a bank 
loan;93 
x did not provide the company’s records, and so the Tribunal could not be 
satisfied that Mr Dancey took action to ensure that the company kept 
proper books of account and financial records;94 and 
  
                                                 
84  Ibid [9].  
85  Ibid [25]. 
86  Ibid [26]. 
87  Ibid [27]. 
88  Ibid [27]. 
89  Ibid [28]. 
90  [2014] QCAT 173 (Unreported, Member F FitzPatrick, 30 April 2014). 
91  Ibid [45]. 
92  Ibid [15]. 
93  Ibid [22], [27]. 
94  Ibid [32]–[33]. 
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x did not ensure that the personal guarantees that he gave were covered by 
sufficient assets.95 
 
b) NSW Legal Profession 
As noted above, bankruptcy or other insolvency event is not an immediate 
bar to practise in the legal profession in NSW. Instead, a legal practitioner or 
applicant is required to disclose the event (a ‘show cause’ event) at the time of 
application, and the relevant council is required to determine whether the person 
is a ‘fit and proper person’ to hold a practising certificate. Although a bankruptcy 
or other insolvency event can be considered as one of the ‘suitability’ matters, it 
is not the fact of the bankruptcy that is determinative, it is ‘whether the 
circumstances in which the act of bankruptcy was committed are such as to 
persuade a Council that … such a person is not a fit and proper person to hold a 
practising certificate’.96 The focus is on whether there is ‘some form of moral 
turpitude’;97 dishonesty is sufficient, but is not necessary.98 Two cases where the 
cancellation of a practising certificate was reviewed by the Administrative 
Decisions Tribunal are discussed below. 
One is the case of Barakat v Law Society of New South Wales.99 In this case, 
prior to petitioning for bankruptcy, Mr Barakat had made a number of 
transactions that, according to the Administrative Decisions Tribunal, 
demonstrated that he ‘chose to prefer the financial interests of himself and his 
family over those of the taxpayer and his judgment creditor clients.’100 However, 
on appeal, the NSW Supreme Court found that Mr Barakat’s conduct ‘was 
certainly not dishonest’, he sought and acted on legal advice in respect of the 
transactions, and had regard to the interests of creditors as well as considering his 
own interests a high priority.101 The Court also noted that ‘[m]ore honourable 
courses of action were open’, but this did not mean that the conduct revealed 
‘such deficiency in character’ as to mean he was unfit to practise.102 
In contrast, in Council of the New South Wales Bar Association v Davison,103 
the Administrative Decisions Tribunal agreed with the Bar Association that Mr 
Davison should be removed from the practitioner’s roll as a result of breaches of 
his legal and civic obligations in relation to his taxation obligations.104 The fact 
                                                 
95  Ibid [35]–[36]. 
96  New South Wales Bar Association v Murphy (2002) 55 NSWLR 23, cited in Barakat v Law Society of 
NSW [2013] NSWADT 271 (Unreported, Member Mullane, Member Fairlie and Member Tingle, 16 May 
2013) [188] (‘Barakat’). 
97  Barakat v Law Society of NSW [2014] NSWSC 773 [150] (Beech-Jones J) (‘Barakat’). 
98  Ibid [151]. 
99  [2014] NSWSC 773. 
100  Barakat [2013] NSWADT 271 (Unreported, Member Mullane, Member Fairlie and Member Tingle, 16 
May 2013) [241]. 
101  Barakat [2014] NSWSC 773 [155]. 
102  Ibid [156]. 
103  [2005] NSWADT 252 (Unreported, Deputy President Chesterman, Member Norton and Member Bennett, 
11 July 2005). 
104  Ibid [95], [103]. 
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that Mr Davison was bankrupt at the time, and had previously been bankrupt 
twice, was not, of itself, an explicit factor in the decision. 
These illustrative examples from the building industry and legal profession 
confirm that the relevance of a bankruptcy to fitness for purpose goes to the 
reasons for the bankruptcy, and the morality or otherwise of the person’s 
decisions in relation to their financial affairs, rather than to the fact of the 
bankruptcy itself. The exercise of the discretion necessitates a ‘going behind’ the 
bankruptcy to undercover the reasons for the bankruptcy, whether other steps 
could reasonably be taken, and whether there is the required ‘moral turpitude’ to 
exclude the person from the occupation or profession. 
 
B   Variation in Bankruptcy Restrictions across Australia 
Our review of occupational restrictions also highlights the potential for 
variation in restrictions across Australia, even in the one occupation or 
profession. For example, Table 3 below shows the differences in the occupational 
restrictions imposed due to bankruptcy in building occupations across NSW, 
Victoria, Queensland and South Australia. This shows differences in: 
x the type of insolvency event that acts as a bar (with some restrictions 
applying only to bankruptcy, while others also involve other types of 
insolvency administrations); 
x the length of time for which the insolvency event is relevant (noting that 
in each example here, the restriction can extend to a person who has been 
discharged from bankruptcy); and  
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Identifying a policy rationale for such variations within one occupational 
group is difficult, and can perhaps be explained in part by the difficulties of 
coordinating a national approach. Variations such as these may have little 
practical impact if most people spend all of their working lives in one 
jurisdiction. However, Australia has a mobile population, with figures from the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics showing that just fewer than 350 000 people 
moved States or Territories during 2013–14, and a similar number moved in 
2012–13.107 For people who are seeking to move, or have moved, interstate, this 
variability in occupational restrictions potentially adds a further level of 
complexity to the impact of bankruptcy on their employment and self-
employment options. 
Similarly, while individuals may be able to determine the impact of a 
bankruptcy event on their current employment or occupation (and thus make 
informed decisions about their insolvency options), the variation between 
occupations makes it difficult to determine the potential effect of bankruptcy on 
future employment options. 
 
C   Informal Labelling through Disclosure Obligations 
A second group of laws that we identified in our review facilitate informal 
labelling of bankrupts and former bankrupts. These are laws that require 
disclosure of bankruptcy status in employment and business settings, but do not 
proscribe any specific consequences for the bankruptcy. 
 
1 Disclosure Obligations in Occupational Regulation 
There are a number of occupations where the relevant legislation imposes an 
obligation upon persons who become bankrupt to disclose that bankruptcy to 
their employer, but where the relevant legislation, regulation or policy does not 
specify any further consequences of the bankruptcy. Table 4 sets out the details 
of three settings in which such disclosure obligations occur. 
In these circumstances, it is not known whether or not these restrictions are 
used to terminate or restrict employment of a person following disclosure of a 
bankruptcy. However, clearly there would be the potential for some adverse 
consequences following disclosure, and the obligations are likely, at a minimum, 








                                                 
107  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Demographic Statistics: June Quarter 2014 (Cat No 3101.1, 
ABS, Canberra, 18 December 2014) 44, Table 17. <http://www.ausstats.abs.gov.au/ausstats/ 
subscriber.nsf/0/126E319BBCA7E237CA257DB1001620B4/$File/31010_jun%202014.pdf>. 
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2 Disclosure Obligations in the Bankruptcy Act 
The Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) also facilitates informal labelling by 
imposing an obligation on persons who are bankrupt to disclose their bankruptcy 
status when obtaining credit or entering into a hire purchase agreement; or when 
obtaining goods or services from a person by giving a promissory note, bill of 
exchange or cheque, or promising to pay for the goods or services. In all cases, 
the obligation to disclose arises when the amount in question is equal to, or more 
than, the prescribed amount (currently $5447).109 
In addition, if an undischarged bankrupt is carrying on a business under an 
assumed name, in the name of another person, or under a firm name (alone or in 
partnership), he or she is required to disclose their true name and bankruptcy 
status to every person with whom the bankrupt (or the partnership) deals 
(regardless of the size of the transaction).110 
Faced with such information, many suppliers and other persons with whom 
the bankrupt person deals may commonly decide against a one-off or continuing 
relationship. The obligation to disclose bankruptcy status to creditors, suppliers 
and others may therefore lead to adverse consequences, and make it difficult, if 
not impossible, for an undischarged bankrupt to carry on a business or to set up a 
new business. Notably this obligation of disclosure applies only during the period 
of bankruptcy, and ceases once a person is discharged from bankruptcy. In this 
way, it contrasts with some occupational restrictions, where the restriction 
continues for a period of time after discharge from bankruptcy. 
 
D   Informal Labelling through Public Records 
The third way in which the law facilitates informal labelling of people who 
are, or have been, bankrupt is through the requirement for a permanent, publicly 
accessible database of bankruptcy administrations. 
Bankruptcies are no longer published in national, state or territory 
newspapers. However, AFSA is responsible for administering the NPII, which is 
established as a permanent, public record, of bankruptcy administrations, 
including bankruptcies, debt agreements, and personal insolvency agreements.111 
Similarly, potential suppliers or clients can seek information about bankruptcy 
status through the NPII (even where disclosure is not required under the 
                                                 
109  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 269(1)(a)–(ad); ‘Above this limit, bankrupts … must disclose their 
bankrupt … status when seeking to obtain goods or services on credit, by hire purchase or cheque; when 
leasing, hiring or promising to pay for goods and services; or when seeking to obtain an amount by 
promising to supply goods or render services’: Australian Financial Security Authority, Indexed Amounts 
(20 September 2015) <https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/indexed-amounts/indexed-amounts-1>. 
110  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 269(1)(b).  
111  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 5 and Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) reg 13, sch 8 list the information 
to be entered on the NPII; see generally Australian Financial Security Authority, Maintaining the 
National Personal Insolvency Index (Official Receiver Practice Statement 8, 8 September 2015) 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/about-us/policies-and-practices/official-receiver-practice-statements/ 
maintaining-the-national-personal-insolvency-index>. 
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Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth).112 Upon payment of the required fee ($15 from 1 July 
2015),113 anyone can search the NPII to find out whether a particular individual is 
in, or has ever been in, a bankruptcy administration in Australia. 114 There is 
currently no restriction on who can access the NPII data, and for what purpose.115 
An employer can also bypass the NPII altogether, and ask (directly or 
through an agent) an employee or prospective employee to provide information 
about their bankruptcy status. Some employers specifically seek information 
about bankruptcy on their application forms.116 Again, there is nothing to prevent 
employers from making such a request; and a failure to grant such a request is 
likely to be perceived by an employee or prospective employee as leading to 
adverse consequences, including perhaps being excluded from consideration.117 
Employers can similarly seek access to a wider range of financial history 
information (including bankruptcy) that is found in consumer credit reports. 
Credit reporting agencies are generally permitted to provide only credit reports to 
credit providers,118 and only for use in credit assessment and similar decisions.119 
                                                 
112  One commercial provider of business check services explains: ‘Business credit express reports help small 
to medium business reduce risk in decision making, allowing you to check a company is legitimate, 
confirm an organisation’s details such as ACN and registered address, find out an organisation’s 
structure, including shareholder details, check a company’s credit history, including the directors behind 
it. Explore our reports now to begin mitigating potential risk of people you do business with’: Veda 
Advantage, Reports (2015) <http://www.veda.com.au/businesscreditexpress/reports>. 
113  Australian Financial Security Authority, Fees and Charges <https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/fees-and-
charges/fees-and-charges>.  
114  Note that a person can ask that their address be suppressed from the NPII if publication will jeopardise 
their safety, but their name and birthdate cannot be suppressed: Australian Financial Security Authority, 
Requesting to Suppress or Correct Personal Details <www.afsa.gov.au/resources/npii/requesting-to-
suppress-personal-details>. Also, the Official Receiver can refuse to allow a person access to any 
documents if that access would jeopardise the safety of any person: Australian Financial Security 
Authority, Inspecting Documents Filed with the Official Receiver (Official Receiver Practice Statement 9, 
28 October 2014), 9–10 <https://www.afsa.gov.au/about-us/policies-and-practices/official-receiver-
practice-statements/searching-the-public-record-and-inspection-of-documents>. 
115  Australian Financial Security Authority, Maintaining the National Personal Insolvency Index, above n 
111, 8; Consumer Credit Legal Centre (NSW), Credit Reporting: Getting It Right for Consumers 
(Research Report, April 2007) 118. We note the helpful suggestion from a reviewer that it would be 
interesting to compare the permanency of the public record for bankruptcy and other personal insolvency 
administrations, and the policy rationale for this permanency, with the provision for spent convictions in 
criminal law settings, see eg, Criminal Law (Rehabilitation of Offenders) Act 1986 (Qld) and similar laws 
for other Australian jurisdictions. However, a discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this article. 
116  See, eg, application forms for the police service in WA and SA: for WA, see Western Australia Police, 
Application for Employment as a Police Officer <http://www.stepforward.wa.gov.au/assets/PDFs/App-
for-Employment-as-a-Police-Officer-Feb-2013.pdf>; for SA, see South Australia Police, Application for 
Employment <http://www.achievemore.com.au/pdf/PO-SAPOL-Application-for-Employment.pdf>.  
117  See, eg, Lea Shepard ‘Toward a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’ (2012) 53 Boston 
College Law Review 1695, 1748. 
118  Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ss 20E(1), 20E(3)(a), 20F. Some exceptions apply – including, where disclosure 
is required or authorised by an Australian law or court/tribunal order; or where disclosure is for the 
purposes of a recognised external dispute resolution scheme to which the credit reporting body or a credit 
provider belongs; or where disclosure is to an enforcement body where the credit reporting body is 
satisfied that the body believes on reasonable grounds that the individual concerned has committed a 
serious credit infringement: at ss 20E(2), (3). 
119  See the list of permitted disclosures in Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 20F. 
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However, there is nothing to prohibit an employer asking a job applicant to 
provide a copy of their consumer report,120 and to use that information as they see 
fit, subject to the requirements of the privacy legislation. 121 Again, failure to 
accede to such a request has the potential to lead to adverse consequences or 
adverse implications being made. 
 
E   Informal Labelling through Employer Policies 
Finally, informal labelling occurs through internal policies and disclosure 
requirements of employers, even in the absence of restrictions or disclosure 
obligations imposed by law. The relatively accessible legislation, regulations and 
rules that impose bankruptcy restrictions for particular occupations or positions 
therefore tell only part of the story. 
For example, although legislation governing the Australian Public  
Service (‘APS’) does not specify that insolvency is a barrier to employment,122 
information provided to potential applicants makes it clear that security 
clearances for appointment can, in some circumstances, include a bankruptcy 
check.123 
Further, the vetting practices for personnel security guidelines’ document 
suggests that a financial history check will be required for baseline vetting; a 
financial statement will be required for higher levels of clearance; and a financial 
probity check will be required for the highest level of clearance.124 A document 
produced for Queensland Public Service agencies similarly suggests that a 
bankruptcy search should be conducted before finalising a short-list for senior 
                                                 
120  In its 2007 Credit Reporting report, the Consumer Credit Legal Centre NSW (now the Financial Rights 
Legal Centre) recommended that a prohibition be introduced against requiring an individual to provide a 
copy of their credit report for or in the course of any business or enterprise: Consumer Credit Legal 
Centre (NSW), above n 115, 119 (Recommendation 36), 141 (Recommendation 47).  
121  Concerns about this ‘back-door’ method of accessing consumer credit information were raised in the 
Australian Law Reform Commission’s (‘ALRC’) inquiry into the privacy law. However, the ALRC took 
the view that there was no need to prohibit individuals from being required to provide their credit 
reporting information for non-credit related purposes, suggesting that the privacy principle that collection 
of information must be ‘necessary’ to an organisation’s functions or activities would be sufficient 
regulation: Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and 
Practice (Report No 108, May 2008) 1981 [59.55].  
122  The legislation does specify that the engagement of an APS employee may be made subject to conditions 
notified to the employee, including conditions dealing with ‘security and character clearances’: Public 
Service Act 1999 (Cth) s 22(6)(d). 
123  The document notes that ‘[b]ankruptcy can be taken into account in assessing your suitability if it is 
relevant to the specific requirements of the employment opportunity. A bankruptcy check may be 
required in some cases as part of a security clearance’: Australian Public Service Commission, FAQ: 
Criminal Record or Bankrupt (1 Feb 2004) <http://www.apsc.gov.au/publications-and-media/faq/can-i-
get-a-job-in-the-australian-public-service-if-i-have-a-criminal-record-or-have-been-declared-bankrupt>. 
124  Protective Security Policy Section, Personnel Security Guidelines: Vetting Practices (Version 1.2, 
Attorney-General’s Department, April 2015) 20 <http://www.protectivesecurity.gov.au/personnel 
security/Documents/PersonnelsecurityguidelinesVettingpractices.pdf>. 
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leadership positions, 125  and templates for position descriptions indicate that 
applicants for senior leadership and technical specialist positions will not be 
eligible for appointment if they are an undischarged bankrupt.126 
Similarly, although there is nothing in the relevant legislation restricting 
bankrupts from joining the Northern Territory Police Services, Integrity 
Guidelines for recruitment include the following: 
Recruitment staff may allow an applicant to remain in the selection process where:  
x the applicant’s bankruptcy was discharged or the order expired more than five 
years ago;  
x did not form part of a series or pattern of similar orders;  
x the applicant has otherwise demonstrated very high standard of conduct; and  
x there are no other circumstances or criminal history which brings the 
applicant’s integrity into doubt. 
… All bankruptcy matters to be referred to the Committee for evaluation and 
determination based on circumstances and applicants may be excluded.127 
Material for applicants to the Australian Federal Police also suggests that an 
exclusion from eligibility may apply in the case of bankruptcy,128 and application 
forms for police services in South Australia and Western Australia require 
disclosure of any current or former bankruptcies; and, in the case of South 
Australia, disclosure of whether any bankruptcy proceedings are under 
consideration.129 
 
F   Bankruptcy Discrimination Not Prohibited 
As we have just described, a person may be required to disclose their 
bankruptcy to an employer, supplier or client or potential employer, supplier or 
client under a legislative obligation, or in response to a specific request for that 
information. Alternatively the bankruptcy might be discovered through an NPII 
search or other means. However, unlike official labelling through occupational 
restrictions, the law does not provide for specific consequences of informal 
labelling of bankruptcy. Instead, it is up to the recipient of the information to 
determine whether and how they will use that information in business or 
decision-making, including decisions about new appointments, promotions or 
other opportunities in employment, or in decisions about supply and purchasing 
and business ventures. Such decisions can be made on an individual basis, or 
                                                 
125  Public Service Commission, Best Practice Guide for Executive Recruitment and Selection (Version 1.l, 
Queensland Government, 18 October 2013) 9 <http://www.psc.qld.gov.au/publications/assets/guidelines/ 
Best-practice-guide-for-executive-recruitment-and-selection.pdf>. 
126  See, eg, role description template for executive leadership positions; role description template for 
executive technical specialist positions: Public Service Commission, Recruitment and Selection (2013) 
<http://www.psc.qld.gov.au/for-executives/employment/recruitment-and-selection.aspx>. 
127  Northern Territory Police, Assessment Guidelines for Recruiting Staff and the Integrity Committee, 4 
< http://www.pfes.nt.gov.au/~/media/Files/Recruitment/Police/General/Integrity%20Guidelines.ashx > . 
128  Australian Federal Police, AFP Character Guidelines (2014), 5 <http://www.afp.gov.au/~/media/afp/pdf/ 
e/employment-character-guidelines.pdf>. 
129  For WA, see Western Australia Police, above n 116; for SA, see South Australia Police, above n 116. 
Note that we have not reviewed the application forms for all police services. 
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through a blanket policy,130 and can be decisions or policies that have adverse 
impacts on bankrupts and former bankrupts. Despite the potential for significant 
adverse consequences, discrimination in employment and business on the 
grounds of current or former bankruptcy is not prohibited under Commonwealth, 
state or territory anti-discrimination laws.131 
In conclusion, the discussion above shows that there are a number of ways in 
which the law creates, maintains and/or facilitates bankruptcy stigma in an 
employment and business context. In the next Part, we discuss the reasons why 
this situation warrants review. 
 
IV   WHY DOES THE REINFORCEMENT OF BANKRUPTCY 
STIGMA MATTER? 
In the above section, we have identified a number of ways in which the law 
entrenches or encourages bankruptcy stigma through official and informal 
labelling. However, this does not of itself necessarily identify a problem that 
requires addressing.132 For example, it may be that bankruptcy restrictions are 
appropriate in relation to employment and business, at least in some 
circumstances, including where fraud is involved. In this Part then, we identify 
and describe two ways in which the law’s role in relation to bankruptcy stigma 
does matter and does require attention. 
 
A   Stigma and the Fresh Start Objective 
First, the entrenchment of bankruptcy stigma through the mechanisms 
described above operates to inhibit the fresh start objective of bankruptcy. That 
one of the objectives of bankruptcy in Australia is to assist a debtor to receive a 
fresh start at the conclusion of their bankruptcy is a commonly voiced opinion,133 
although there is not always a consistent view about the scope and meaning of 
the fresh start concept in Australia and elsewhere. 
                                                 
130  For example, Queensland Public Service template documents discussed above.  
131  For example, at the Commonwealth level, age, sex, race and disability discrimination are prohibited: Age 
Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth); Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth); Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth); Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth). 
132  Efrat, above n 1, 393. Although the World Bank Report, above n 10, 44 [125] notes that ‘[a]ttitudes about 
debt and cultural stigma change slowly, and relatively little can be done to affect such an expansive and 
disperse notion directly, but policymakers can make and have made choices to minimize stigma by 
avoiding or repealing judgmental language and punitive measures in existing laws’; see also Sousa, above 
n 3, 453: ‘[w]hile this study and others like it evidence the pervading nature of bankruptcy stigma, some 
have argued that the stigma traditionally associated with bankruptcy has declined over time’. 
133  The Harmer Report includes as an aim of modern insolvency law the ‘effective relief or release from the 
financial liabilities and obligations of the insolvent’: Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency 
Inquiry: Summary of Report (Report No 45, 13 December 1988) 2 [5]. 
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For example, some commentators have suggested that the fresh start  
potential of bankruptcy provides a ‘clean sheet’;134 ‘economic rehabilitation’;135 
the opportunity to begin again ‘on the economic treadmill’;136 or a restored ability 
to participate in the open credit economy.137 Other commentators suggest that the 
fresh start in bankruptcy allows debtors to restore their ‘financial well-being’,138 
or to obtain ‘long-term financial health’.139 There are some similarities between 
each of these expositions of the fresh start concept, but they are not identical. 
In a recent review of the fresh start concept, Howell suggested that: 
[C]ommentators have different ways of understanding the fresh start concept in 
bankruptcy. Some emphasise the significance of debt discharge to delivering the 
fresh start, while others consider that more is needed if debtors are to truly receive 
a fresh start. These differences can perhaps be located along a continuum from a 
fresh start that is solely or primarily about debt discharge (the debt discharge-
focused fresh start), to a fresh start that is about debtor rehabilitation in a broader 
sense (the rehabilitation-focused fresh start).140 
In order to better understand the fresh start objective as expressed in the 
Australian bankruptcy system, Howell reviewed references to it in the key 
primary and secondary sources of bankruptcy law in Australia.141 She noted that, 
from the debtor’s perspective, a primary outcome of the bankruptcy process in 
Australia is that, at the conclusion of the bankruptcy, the debtor will be released 
(with some exceptions)142 from their obligation to pay the debts proved in the 
bankruptcy.143 This provides at least a debt discharged focused fresh start. 
There are also aspects of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) that  
facilitate a wider, rehabilitation sense of the fresh start. These include  
the protection of certain essential assets from realisation and distribution  
to creditors; 144  a relatively generous threshold before a debtor is required to  
                                                 
134  Lynden Griggs, ‘Bankruptcy Policy and the Decision of the High Court in Pyramid Building Society (In 
Liq) v Terry’ (1999) 1 University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 57, 57. 
135  Katherine Porter and Deborah Thorne, ‘The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start’ (2006) 92 Cornell Law 
Review 67, 68. 
136  Griggs, above n 134, 69. 
137  Margaret Howard, ‘A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy’ (1987) 48 Ohio State Law Journal 
1047, 1048. 
138  Jay L Zagorsky and Lois R Lupica, ‘A Study of Consumers’ Post-discharge Finances: Struggle, Stasis, or 
Fresh-Start?’(2008) 16 American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review 283, 284. 
139  Jean Braucher, ‘Consumer Bankruptcy as Part of the Social Safety Net: Fresh Start or Treadmill?’ (2004) 
44 Santa Clara Law Review 1065, 1070. 
140  Nicola Howell, ‘The Fresh Start Goal of the Bankruptcy Act: Giving a Temporary Reprieve or 
Facilitating Debtor Rehabilitation’ (2014) 14(3) QUT Law Review 29, 34. 
141  Ibid. 
142  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 82(2)–(3B) (debts not provable in bankruptcy), ss 153(2)–(3) (debts not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy). 
143  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 153.  
144  Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116(2); Bankruptcy Regulations 1996 (Cth) reg 6.03. 
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make income contributions during bankruptcy; 145  and the protection of post- 
bankruptcy income146 and assets from creditors.147 However, these provisions are 
counterbalanced by other aspects of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) or other 
legislation that have, or may have, the effect of limiting the potential for debtor 
rehabilitation.148 There is also a tension between the requirements for income 
contributions, and the policy of encouraging bankrupts to earn income during 
bankruptcy, and the occupational restrictions and other aspects of labelling 
discussed in this article.149 
Howell concluded that providing for a fresh start is one of the goals of the 
Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), but that ‘the fresh start as it has been implemented in 
practice is focused on debt discharge, rather than debtor rehabilitation’. 150  A 
number of the key legal and policy documents reviewed by Howell also include 
references to the importance of debtor rehabilitation. This suggests that there is a 
need to consider whether a wider rehabilitative fresh start goal might be a new 
focus for the bankruptcy system into the future.151 
However, the entrenchment of bankruptcy stigma in an employment and 
business context clearly works against the achievement of this wider sense of the 
fresh start in theory and in practice, it inhibits the achievement of an 
improvement in financial wellbeing after the conclusion of bankruptcy. 
That the ability to earn an income contributes to whether a fresh start can be 
achieved after bankruptcy makes intuitive sense. However, it is also supported by 
research from the United States. In their analysis of interviews with 359 debtors 
who had filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2001,152 Porter and Thorne report that, 
a year after filing, eight per cent of respondents reported that their financial 
situation was worse than it had been at the time of filing, while over a quarter (27 
per cent) reported that their financial situation was about the same as at filing.153 
In comparing the survey responses, Porter and Thorne found that ‘worse-off 
families were five and a half times more likely than better-off families to report 
                                                 
145  Income contributions are calculated on the basis of 50 per cent of the excess income earned above the 
threshold: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 139S. As at 6 March 2015, the income threshold for a person with 
no dependents was $53 280.50: Australian Financial Security Authority, Indexed Amounts (28 January 
2015) <https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/indexed-amounts>. Note that debtors can request a higher 
threshold on the grounds of hardship: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 139T. 
146  During bankruptcy, income contributions are required once the debtor’s income exceeds the relevant 
income threshold: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 139P.  
147  See Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) s 116(1), which provides that the bankrupt’s divisible property includes 
property belonging to, or vesting in a bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy, and property 
acquired by the bankrupt after the commencement of bankruptcy and before discharge. This is subject to 
an obligation to make payment of an income contribution that was assessed during bankruptcy. 
148  Including, eg, the relatively long period of bankruptcy, the public accessibility of bankruptcy information, 
employment restrictions, and the absence of any integrated financial capability training: see Howell, 
above n 140, 37. 
149  We acknowledge the comments of an anonymous reviewer drawing attention to this tension. 
150  Howell, above n 140, 47. 
151  Ibid 50. 
152  Porter and Thorne, above n 135, 81.  
153  Ibid 87. 
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an income drop of at least 10%’.154 They found that there was not necessarily a 
correlation between having a low income and reporting a worsened financial 
position, it was ‘the direction of income change that influences whether a family 
is able to capitalize on the fresh start offered by a bankruptcy discharge’. 155 
Morato’s statistical analysis of the effects of bankruptcy also shows that people 
who have filed for bankruptcy had reduced income, and reduced number of work 
hours, than those who had not filed for bankruptcy in the same time period.156 
Of course, a drop in income following bankruptcy is not a necessary 
consequence of bankruptcy itself. However, to the extent that stigmatisation of 
persons who are, or have been bankrupt, is used to facilitate, permit or mandate 
adverse employment and business decisions, including decisions about the 
suitability of individuals for appointment, promotion and/or access to 
employment-related benefits, there is the potential for the fresh start goal of 
bankruptcy to be compromised. As Thorne has noted in the United States 
context: 
That debtors would report difficulties finding or keeping jobs because of the 
bankruptcies on their credit reports is particularly disturbing in light of other 
research that suggests that a family’s post-bankruptcy financial success is 
principally dependant on stable or modestly increased income.157 
The restrictions and obligations we have described above, together with the 
ready access to bankruptcy information and the lack of a proscription against 
discriminating against bankrupts in employment in business settings has the 
potential to result in adverse incomes, including denials of employment or 
promotion, or inability to commence or continue in business. The extent to which 
these impacts are crystallised in practice in Australia is not known. Some details 
of the numbers of persons prevented from continuing in a particular occupation 
are published by regulatory authorities, but the numbers appear small.158 And 
information on persons self-excluding from particular occupations due to their 
bankruptcy is not, to our knowledge, reported. 
                                                 
154  Ibid 95. 
155  Ibid 96. 
156  Michelle Maroto, ‘The Scarring Effects of Bankruptcy: Cumulative Disadvantage across Credit and 
Labor Markets’ (2012) 91 Social Forces 99, 110. 
157  Deborah Thorne, ‘Personal Bankruptcy and the Credit Report: Conflicting Mechanisms of Social 
Mobility’ (2007) 11(4) Journal of Poverty 23, 41 (citations omitted). 
158  Eg, in Queensland, during the period 1 December 2013–30 June 2014, 131 individuals were excluded 
from holding a contractor or nominee supervisor licence in the building industry due to ‘involvement in a 
financial failure’: Queensland Building and Construction Commission, Annual Report: 1 December 
2013–30 June2014 (Report, 20 August 2014) 35 <http://www.qbcc.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/QBCC_ 
Annual_Report_-_1Dec13_-_30Jun14.pdf>. This is in a context where there were over 84 000 active 
licenses at 30 June 2014: at 2. 
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The most common occupations of persons who have entered bankruptcy do 
not necessarily have bankruptcy restrictions imposed upon them159 – this might 
suggest that bankruptcy restrictions affect few bankrupts; alternatively it might 
suggest that those working in occupations affected by bankruptcy restrictions will 
seek other methods to deal with financial difficulty. Further, although access to 
the NPII is widespread, with 311 829 searches conduced in 2013–14 (excluding 
those conducted by AFSA itself),160 it is not possible to identify the extent to 
which NPII searches are made to assist with decision-making in employment and 
business contexts. 
There has also been little research on the experience of bankrupts in the job 
market. The only relevant study, involving interviews with bankrupts in 1987–
88, suggested that the impact or perceived impact of bankruptcy on employment 
was not a concern for many of the interviewed participants.161 However, given the 
time that has elapsed since this research, it would not be appropriate to speculate 
on whether similar attitudes are likely to persist today, particularly given 
economic and labour market changes since this research. 
In the United States, where greater attention has been paid to this issue, there 
is more information available on the extent of access to, and use of, bankruptcy 
information and/or credit reports in employment decision-making. One study 
from the Society for Human Resources Management found that nearly half (47 
per cent) of its members reported that they conducted credit background checks 
history when hiring for some or all positions,162 although one commentator has 
suggested that this figure ‘fails to clarify how many employees are actually 
subject to credit checks, or the likelihood that a job seeker will be obliged to 
consent to one in order to be considered for a job.’163 
Looking at it from the perspective of job applicants, Deborah Thorne has 
reported that in a study of 703 debtors in 2003–04, 5.7 per cent of respondents 
                                                 
159  In 2013–14, the most commonly reported categories of occupations for persons entering personal 
insolvency administrations were: other clerical and administrative workers; sales assistants and 
salespersons; road and rail drivers; and other labourers: Australian Financial Security Authority, 
Commentary: All Debtors – Occupations of Debtors Who Have Entered a Personal Insolvency 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/statistics/socio-economic-statistics/occupations/occupations-of-
debtors>. Few of the occupations within these categories are likely to have explicit bankruptcy 
restrictions imposed on entry. 
160  Australian Financial Security Authority, Annual Report 2013–14 (Report, 26 September 2014) 65 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/about-us/annual-report/annual-report-2013-14/afsa-annual-report-2013-14>. 
161  In the Ryan study , of the 20 respondents who reported that they had experienced stigma, two reported 
that they felt that had been rejected by potential employers because of their bankruptcy: Ryan, The Last 
Resort, above n 9, 182; and two (of the 36 who were employed at the time of bankruptcy) reported that 
they were worried about losing their job as a result of their bankruptcy: at 179. On the other hand, 15 
respondents (out of 76) reported that they told their boss about their bankruptcy: at 187, presumably with 
no adverse consequences (none of the forms of experienced stigma reported by respondents included 
stigma from an existing employer: at 184).  
162  Society for Human Resource Management, Background Checking – The Use of Credit Background 
Checks in Hiring Decisions (19 July 2012) <http://www.shrm.org/research/surveyfindings/ 
articles/pages/creditbackgroundchecks.aspx>. 
163  Amy Traub, ‘Credit Reports and Employment: Findings from the 2012 National Survey on Credit Card 
Debt of Low- and Middle-Income Households’ (2013) 46 Suffolk University Law Review 983, 986.  
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reported that they were fired from, denied or had difficulties getting a job 
because of a bankruptcy on their credit report.164 And, from her study, Traub 
reports that 10 per cent of participants who were unemployed had been advised 
they would not be hired because of information in their credit report. 165 The 
figure was higher (one in seven) for applicants with blemished credit histories.166 
Again, these figures might underestimate the extent of the impact of bankruptcy 
or credit history on employment, as the fact that an employment decision is 
based, wholly or partly, on this information will often not be explicitly 
disclosed.167 Another impact of bankruptcy on employment has been suggested 
by Michelle Morato, who finds that ‘bankrupters spent less time working and 
suffered lower earnings, especially those with high levels of education’ than their 
counterparts who had not entered bankruptcy.168  These impacts occur despite 
some protections in the United States against the use of credit checks in 
employment contexts.169 
Thus, although the extent to which the laws which we have discussed in this 
article do have an adverse impact on the ability of bankrupts and former 
bankrupts to earn an income is not known, evidence from the United States 
suggests it is likely to be an issue of concern for a significant number of people. 
Further, to the extent that the law creates official labelling, this is likely to 
directly impact on the extent of informal labelling and bankruptcy discrimination 
in other employment and business contexts. In this way, the law inhibits access to 
a rehabilitative-focused fresh start for people who have been bankrupt. 
 
B   The Evidence Base for Stigmatisation and Labelling is Weak, and Does 
Not Generally Support the Attribution of Negative Characteristics to 
Bankrupts 
Our second concern relates to the policy rationale for the law’s role in 
labelling bankruptcy as deviant, and in permitting informal labelling. The policy 
rationale for the law’s role here is not well defined. To the extent that a rationale 
exists, it appears to be based on ‘common sense wisdom’ about the 
characteristics of persons who become bankrupt. If there were evidence to 
support a correlation between bankruptcy and specific negative personal or other 
attributes, it might be appropriate for the law to play a role in labelling and 
stigmatisation of bankruptcy to protect the public, deter bankruptcy, and/or assist 
employers and businesses to identify appropriate persons with whom to deal or 
                                                 
164  Thorne, above n 157, 37. 
165  Traub, above n 163. 
166  Ibid. 
167  Ibid 986–7. 
168  Maroto, above n 156, 122.  
169  See Consumer Credit Protection 15 USC § 1681(b) Conditions for Furnishing and Using Consumer 
Reports for Employment Purposes. For criticism of the practical effectiveness of these protections, see 
Traub, above n 163; Shepard, ‘Towards a Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 
117, 1749. 
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not deal. However, we contend that there is little empirical evidence to support 
this attribution. 
 
1 The Policy Rationale for Restrictions and Labelling Associated with 
Bankruptcy Is Not Clearly Articulated 
There is only limited discussion of the rationale for the law having a role in 
creating and entrenching bankruptcy stigmatisation in Australia. The issues that 
we have discussed in this article were not explored in either the 1962 Clyne 
Committee Report170 or the 1988 Harmer Report. 171  The Harmer Report does 
include a reference to the possibility that bankruptcy may have adverse impacts 
on employment, but this occurs in the context of identifying factors that a trustee 
could consider in deciding whether to certify a person as suitable for early 
discharge; it does not include consideration of whether the potential for such 
adverse effects should be minimised.172 To the extent that there is discussion in 
the explanatory material for the bankruptcy legislation on the need for a 
permanent, public record of bankruptcy, it refers to an objective of enabling 
‘persons entering into substantial transactions’ to know about another person’s 
insolvency status.173 However, the NPII can equally be used for insubstantial 
transactions or other employment or businesses purposes. We have not been able 
to identify any explicit rationale in the explanatory material for much of the 
current legislation that imposes bankruptcy restrictions for particular 
occupations.174 It may be possible, or even likely, that the restrictions have been 
imposed for reasons other than stigmatisation, but such reasons are not explicitly 
identified in the explanatory material. 
Similarly, the more recent World Bank report did not engage in any 
substantive examination of these issues. The report did at least acknowledge that 
‘the principle of non-discrimination is an important consideration in achieving 
the full benefit of a discharge’;175 that little discussion had occurred on this issue; 
and that it was an issue that required attention in the future.176 
Instead, it appears likely that the law’s role here mirrors perceptions of the 
attributes of persons who have become bankrupt. These views about the 
                                                 
170  The Clyne Committee was appointed by the Federal Attorney-General in 1956 to review Australia’s 
bankruptcy law and submitted its report in 1962. 
171  Australian Law Reform Commission, General Insolvency Inquiry, Report No 45 (1988).  
172  Ibid vol 1, 235 [553]: ‘The Commission considers that where a trustee is determining whether or not to 
issue a certificate of discharge the trustee should be required to take into account the following matters … 
The future financial prospects and aspirations of the bankrupt, including whether the bankruptcy is 
adversely affecting the ability of the bankrupt to obtain employment or advancement in income-earning 
ability’. 
173  Australian Financial Security Authority, Maintaining the National Personal Insolvency Index, above 
n 111, 10. 
174  This may reflect the fact that bankruptcy restrictions are often longstanding in many licensing, 
registration or accreditation regimes, even though the format of the regimes may have changed 
significantly in the ensuing period. An exclusion or restriction based upon bankruptcy might be simply 
seen as a given, with no need to separately explain the rationale. 
175  Kilborn et al, above n 10, 118 [360]. 
176  Ibid 119 [360]. 
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relevance of bankruptcy information to employment and business can be 
observed in advertising and general commentary in Australia. For example, one 
business that provides pre-employment screening services suggests that a basic 
credit check ‘offers an insight into the [individual’s] reliability’,177 while another 
suggests that information from the NPII ‘is relevant to individuals holding 
responsible management positions with financial control’ and that ‘[c]redit 
information on a subject can reveal how an individual handles financial 
responsibility.’178 A law firm advising employers suggests that ‘bankruptcy and 
credit history checks can give a useful indication of a candidate’s level of 
responsibility and reliability’.179 
Similar views about the relevance of bankruptcy and consumer credit 
information are observed in the United States, where there has been greater 
academic, policy and other commentary about these issues. A 2012 survey of 
human resources managers reported that the primary reasons that organisations 
conducted credit checks on job candidates were to reduce or prevent theft and 
embezzlement (45 per cent), to reduce legal liability for negligent hiring (22 per 
cent), and to assess the overall trustworthiness of the job candidate (19 per 
cent).180 
Academic commentators have suggested similar rationales. For example, 
Nielson and Kuhn suggest that the two common justifications for the use of 
credit checks in employment selection processes are that: 
x employees with serious financial problems are thought to be more likely 
to steal, and credit checks have traditionally been commonly used for 
positions in banks and other institutions where employees have access to 
financial accounts, and  
x that an applicant’s credit history is an indicator of her general 
conscientiousness and responsibility, and one that (unlike personality 
tests) is thought to be an objective behavioural record.181 
  
                                                 
177  Professional Recruitment Australia, Reference and Probity <http://pra.com.au/Reference-and-Probity-
Checks>. 
178  NHN Investigations, NHN Pre Employment Screening (2006) <http://www.nhninvestigations.com.au/ 
screening.htm>. 
179  Aoife Gallagher-Watson, Pre-employment Screening Can Help You Avoid Hiring the Wrong Candidate 
(25 May 2014) Colin Biggers & Paisley <http://www.cbp.com.au/publications/2014/may/pre-
employment-screening-can-help-you-avoid-hi-(1)>. 
180  Society for Human Resource Management, above n 162, 10. Interestingly, the two top responses declined 
in percentage between 2010 and 2012, while trustworthiness was given as the primary reason by more 
respondents in 2012 (19 per cent) than in 2010 (12 per cent).  
181  Marsha L Nielsen and Kristine M Kuhn, ‘Late Payments and Leery Applicants: Credit Checks as a 
Selection Test’ (2009) 21 Employee Responsibilities & Rights Journal 115, 116. 
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Shepard has described these two hypotheses as, respectively, the ‘Fraud 
Hypothesis’ and the ‘Responsibility Hypothesis’.182 Other academics from law, 
management and social policy disciplines offer similar views.183 
Other reasons suggested for performing credit checks in an employment 
context include allowing an employer to confirm information about an 
application, including address and employment history; 184  to avoid negligent 
hiring litigation;185 and to comply with specific legal obligations to perform a 
credit check. 186  However, the validity of each of these reasons has been 
questioned by Shepard,187 and they have not, to our knowledge, been specifically 
identified in the Australian context. 
 
2 The Evidence-Base for Attribution of Personal Characteristics 
There have been a small number of studies conducted in the United States 
that have sought to explore a correlation between financial history and job 
performance. For example, Bernerth et al reported a positive correlation between, 
for example, credit scores and conscientious performance (but not one between 
credit scores and deviant workplace activity).188 Oppler et al reported a positive 
relationship between an adverse financial history189 and ‘counterproductive work 
behavior’. 190  Also Ayra et al, in an experimental study, found a positive 
correlation between estimated credit scores and impulsivity, time preference (or 
future orientation) and trustworthiness.191 
In contrast, another study compared actual credit reports of current and 
terminated employees, and found ‘virtually no relationship between credit history 
                                                 
182  Shepard, ‘Towards A Stronger Financial History Anti-discrimination Norm’, above n 117, 1711, 1714. 
183  See, eg, Traub, above n 163, 987; Maroto, above n 156, 103; Thorne, above n 157, 40; Jon Socolof and 
Julie Jordan, ‘Best Practices for Health Care Background Screening’ (2006) 8 Journal of Health Care 
Compliance 5, 9.  
184  See, eg, Nielsen and Kuhn, above n 181, 117. 
185  See, eg, Jund-Ming Wang and Brian H Kleiner ‘Effective Employment Screening Practices’ (2004) 27(4–
5) Management Research News 99, 101. See also the suggestion by Kiviat that credit checks may be used 
because the mistake of hiring the wrong worker is more likely to be penalised that the mistake of letting a 
good worker slip away: Barbara Kiviat, ‘Moral Storytelling From Financial Pasts: How Employers 
Translate Credit Reports into Hiring Decisions’ (Presentation to Law and Society Meeting, Seattle, May 
2015). 
186  See, eg, Society for Human Resource Management, above n 162, 10. 
187  See, eg, Shepard, ‘Towards A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117, 1718. 
188  Jeremy B Bernerth et al, ‘An Empirical Investigation of Dispositional Antecedents and Performance-
Related Outcomes of Credit Scores’ (2012) 97 Journal of Applied Psychology 469, 474; although the 
authors note small sample and other limitations in relation to the relationship between deviant work 
behaviours.  
189  Negative financial history was recorded if the person answered yes to one or more of the following 
questions: ‘In the last 7 years, have you, or a company over which you exercised some control, filed for 
bankruptcy, been declared bankrupt, been subject to a tax lien, or had legal judgment rendered against 
you for a debt?’ and ‘Are you now over 180 days delinquent on any loan or financial obligation?’: 
Edward S Oppler et al, ‘The Relationship between Financial History and Counterproductive Work 
Behavior’ (2008) 16 International Journal of Selection and Assessment 416, 417. 
190  Ibid 418.  
191  Shweta Arya, Catherine Eckel and Colin Wichman, ‘Anatomy of the Credit Score’ (2013) 95 Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 175, 184. 
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and performance ratings’,192 and that, although ‘a few of the measures of credit 
history were correlated with termination decisions’, ‘this number is sufficiently 
small that chance is probably the best explanation’. 193  The authors cautioned 
against using credit history data in employment selection ‘unless the company 
demonstrates evidence that such data have validity for predicting employee 
behaviour.’194 
Limitations in a number of these studies may affect the generalisability of 
their results.195 In any case, none of these studies refer specifically to bankruptcy, 
the focus of this paper. Instead, given the direct access that employers in the 
United States can have to credit reports, these studies focus on wider categories 
of financial history and financial information. As a result, they cannot be used to 
directly support a claim that bankruptcy alone is evidence of characteristics 
detrimental to work performance. 
The difficulty of attributing particular personal characteristics to people who 
are, or have been, bankrupt, is compounded by the fact that the characteristics of 
people who become bankrupt, and the circumstances that lead to bankruptcy, are 
highly variable. In 2011, 78 per cent of bankruptcies were ‘consumer’ 
bankruptcies, and 22 per cent were business related bankruptcies; just over half 
of bankrupts (53 per cent) were employed at the time of their bankruptcy; but a 
similar percentage (52 per cent) earned less than $30 000 at the time of their 
bankruptcy.196 The most common (self-reported) primary causes for non-business 
bankruptcies commencing in 2013–14 were unemployment/loss of income (35 
per cent), excessive use of credit (19 per cent), domestic discord (12 per cent) 
and ill health or absence of health insurance (9 per cent).197 Most of these reasons 
do not suggest any fault or moral failing on the part of the individual concerned.  
 
                                                 
192  Laura Koppes Bryan and Jerry K Palmer, ‘Do Job Applicant Credit Histories Predict Performance 
Appraisal Ratings or Termination Decisions? (2012) 15 Psychologist-Manager Journal 106, 116. 
193  Ibid 119–20. 
194  Ibid 119. 
195  See, eg, in the Bernerth study, the study examined the relationship between credit scores and the various 
characteristics, when employers do not generally access credit scores, but the more detailed (and difficult 
to interpret) credit report : Traub, above n 163, 987. In the Oppler study, there was no attempt to 
distinguish between personal and business credit history (at 988), the study relied on self-reported data 
‘which may or may not be reflective of an applicant’s credit history as interpreted by an employer’: Lea 
Shepard, ‘Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination’ (2014) 46 Connecticut Law Review 
993, 1009; and the counterproductive work behaviours included failure to pay debts and misuse of credit 
cards; these are not necessarily related to work performance or employment suitability. And in the Ayra 
study, the sample size was small and from a limited population, and the FICO scores were estimated, 
rather than actual scores : Ayra et al, above n 191. See also criticisms in Traub, above n 163, 987–8; 
Shepard, ‘Towards A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117, 1715–6; 
Shepard, ‘Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination’, 1009–10. 
196  Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, Profile of Debtors 2011 (Report, 2012) 15, 17–18 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/statistics/profiles-of-debtors-documents/profiles-of-debtors-2011>. 
197  Data calculated from Australian Financial Security Authority, Non-Business Causes Time Series 
<https://www.afsa.gov.au/resources/statistics/socio-economic-statistics/causes-1/causes-non-business-
related>. 
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Bankrupts also have varying occupations,198 debts199 and assets200 at the time of 
bankruptcy, again suggesting that it is difficult to identify particular personal 
characteristics that apply universally to persons who are, or have been, bankrupt. 
There is little evidence of widespread fraud amongst bankrupts; instead, the 
evidence that we do have (albeit quite dated now) suggests that people who enter 
bankruptcy do so regretfully, with a feeling of shame, and only as a last resort.201 
And while there is a correlation between having been bankrupt once, and the 
likelihood of entering bankruptcy again in the future,202 it is difficult to see how 
this potential is likely to be genuinely relevant to employment decision-making. 
Overall, the number of people who have entered bankruptcy more than once is 
relatively low, with only 16 per cent of bankruptcies in 2011 (the latest data 
available) involving people who had previously been bankrupt.203 
Bankruptcy does provides evidence of financial difficulty at the time of 
bankruptcy, but figures from the Australian Bureau of Statistics show that, in 
2009–10, just under one-third of the sample group reported at least one indicator 
of financial stress, while 8.8 per cent reported three or more indicators of 
financial stress.204 Bankruptcy simply provides a more easily identifiable marker 
of financial difficulty, but this is not a justifiable reason for discriminating 
against current or potential employees.205 
Thus, there seems to be little in the way of conclusive evidence for attributing 
particular general qualities (relevant to employment performance) to persons who 
are, or have been bankrupt, and in the absence of this evidence, the policy 
rationale for permitting all employers the potential to access, and use without 
restriction, bankruptcy information in employment decision-making is not strong. 
 
3 A Different Case for High Trust Occupations or Occupations in the 
Financial Services Sector? 
As can be seen from Tables 1–3 above, bankruptcy restrictions are commonly 
imposed in occupations that are perceived to be high trust occupations and/or 
occupations involving financial services or financial responsibility. For example, 
politicians, accountants, trustees, company directors and managers of deposit-
                                                 
198  Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, above n 196, 28–9. 
199  Ibid 20. 
200  Ibid 25. 
201  In the Ryan study, most bankrupts took positive action at the time they realised they had a serious 
financial problem; most sought advice from a financial counselling service or other advice service, where 
they were presented with a range of options, and many felt stigma as a result of their bankruptcy: Ryan, 
The Last Resort, above n 9, 120, 124, 185–6. 
202  The chance of any person going bankrupt is 1 per cent, cf 16 per cent having been bankrupt more than 
once – calculated from data in: Insolvency and Trustee Service Australia, above n 196, 15. 
203  Ibid.  
204  Ben Phillips and Binod Nepal, ‘Going Without: Financial Hardship in Australia’ (Report, National Centre 
for Social and Economic Modelling, August 2012) 15. 
205  In fact, Shepard has suggested that because bankrupts have decreased indebtedness, the fraud hypothesis 
has less validity than it might have had for heavily indebted persons: Shepard, ‘Towards A Stronger 
Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117, 1757–8. 
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taking institutions are all subject to bankruptcy restrictions in Australia.206 In the 
United States, a 2012 survey suggested that credit checks are more frequently 
used by human resources personnel when considering job candidates for 
positions with fiduciary and financial responsibilities (87 per cent), for senior 
executive positions (42 per cent), and for job candidates who have access to 
highly confidential employee information (34 per cent). 207  And legislation  
in the United States, where there is some, albeit limited, protection  
against discrimination of persons who have been bankrupt,208 incorporates wide 
exceptions in both State and Federal laws, including exceptions where ‘[t]he 
position involves access to personal or confidential information, financial 
information, trade secrets, or State or national security information.’ 209  This  
is a very widely drawn net.210  Even some proponents for strengthening anti-
discrimination laws appear to support some level of exception for ‘high  
trust’ occupations or roles where the occupant might have access to  
significant financial or other resources.211 Such exemptions reinforce the fraud 
and responsibility hypotheses, despite the fact that the evidence supporting these 
hypotheses is limited at best.212 
To the extent that bankruptcy may be relevant in particular circumstances, it 
may be appropriate to consider the specific circumstances leading to bankruptcy 
to confirm whether the bankruptcy is likely to have an adverse effect on a 
person’s ability to perform the job and garner public/private trust. Again, 
however, the reference to public trust presupposes an acceptance of bankruptcy 
stigmatisation, based on the (ill-founded) perception that persons who are, or 
have been bankrupt, are less responsible, less moral, and have a greater 
propensity to engage in fraud or theft, than persons who have never been 
bankrupt. Changing this perception is unlikely to occur while bankruptcy 
labelling and stigmatisation is permitted and encouraged by the law,213 and we 
                                                 
206  See Tables 1 and 2 above. 
207  Society for Human Resource Management, above n 162, 16. 
208  For criticism of Federal Credit Reporting Act protections, see Jeanette E McPherson, ‘The 
Antidiscrimination Provision Does Not Apply to Private Employers Who Deny Employment Based upon 
Bankruptcy Status’ (2011) 20(6) Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law & Practice Art 4. 
209  Beverley Earle, Gerald Madek and David Missirian, ‘The Legality of Pre-employment Credit Checks: A 
Proposed Model Statute to Remedy An Inequity’ (2012) 20 Virginia Journal of Social Policy and the 
Law 159, 188.  
210  Ibid; see also Shepard, ‘Towards A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117, 
1714. 
211  For example, Gallagher supports an exemption for employment of persons ‘handling an organization’s 
finances, accounting, or receipts and expenditures’: Kelly Gallagher, ‘Rethinking the Fair Credit Rporting 
Act: When Requesting Credit Reports for ‘Employment Purposes’ Goes Too Far’ (2006) 91 Iowa Law 
Review 1593, 1618; Earle, Madek and Missirian propose a model law that would exempt ‘[h]igh-ranking 
policy making executives’ and persons ‘who may authorize expenditures of $25,000 or more, or who 
have signatory authority over more than $100,000 … in any calendar year’: Earle, Madek and Missirian 
above n 209, 191–2. 
212  Shepard, ‘Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination’, above n 195, 1009. 
213  In the context of the Federal Credit Reporting Act, Shepard notes that the provisions assume the validity 
of these perceptions and sanctions and legitimises employer’s use of financial information: Shephard, 
‘Towards A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117, 1749.  
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contend that, even for certain high trust occupations or roles, attention should be 
given to the policy justification for restrictions. 
 
4 A Different Case for Licensing Restrictions? 
The above discussion relates to the attribution of particular negative 
characteristics to persons as current or potential employees. We have suggested 
that the lack of evidence for such attribution means that there is not a strong 
policy justification for permitting employers to have access to, and to use, 
bankruptcy information. 
However, a different approach might be justified in the context of licensing 
or registration arrangements, where the licence holder or registered person 
contracts with consumers for services, and the government plays a role as 
gatekeeper.214 For example, in the context of the prospect of moving towards  
a national occupational licensing scheme for some occupations, 215  including 
property, electrical and plumbing and gas fitting occupations, the regulation 
impact statement notes the following: 
Financial probity requirements aim to ascertain whether the financial integrity of 
the applicant is such that the risk of consumers dealing with the licensed person is 
minimised. One of the aims of licensing of business entities (contractors) is to 
protect consumers from those who have been involved in the mismanagement of 
business.216 
Thus, the rationale for bankruptcy restrictions here focuses on the need to 
protect consumers from the risks of businesses becoming insolvent. In this 
context, it is relevant to note that there is some correlation between having been 
bankrupt once and repeat bankruptcies.217  This suggests that contracting with 
such a person invites a greater possibility of bankruptcy, with its attendant risk of 
having contracted for work left uncompleted. On the other hand, it is not 
necessarily the case that a current or former bankruptcy resulted from a 
‘mismanagement of business’. In fact, most bankruptcies are not related to 
business debts at all.218 And for bankruptcies that result from involvement in a 
business, the primary reason given for bankruptcy (42 per cent of respondents) is 
economic conditions,219 which may have little to do with mismanagement of a 
business. 
Another factor relevant for licensing arrangements may be the need for 
licensing authorities to ‘scrutinize applicants’ financial histories … to ensure that 
the prospective licensee will satisfy the financial prerequisites necessary for  
                                                 
214  See, eg, Karen Cordry, ‘Section 525: Policy Thoughts about Discriminating against Debtors’ [2010] 
Norton Annual Survey of Bankruptcy Law 4, 22. 
215  The scheme was later disbanded. 
216  Council of Australian Governments’ National Licensing Steering Committee, Decision Regulation 
Impact Statement: Proposal for National Licensing of the Electrical Occupations (2013) 44.  
217  See above n 202. 
218  In 2011, only 22 per cent of bankruptcies were business-related bankruptcies: Insolvency and Trustee 
Service Australia, above n 196, 15. 
219  Ibid 16. 
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him or her to succeed in the venture.’220 In this context, imposing bankruptcy 
restrictions on entry to an occupation involving direct contracts with consumer 
clients may be may be less objectionable than in the employment context 
generally. However, such restrictions should proceed only where a genuine 
policy rationale can be articulated; they should not be based on unsubstantiated 
claims relating to honesty, responsibility, or similar attributes. 
As we have described above, there are real difficulties with the entrenchment 
and encouragement of bankruptcy stigma by the law. First, because it inhibits a 
rehabilitative sense of the fresh start objective of bankruptcy; and second, 
because there is little evidence that would fairly allow particular negative 
characteristics to be attributed to persons who are, or have been, bankrupt. There 
is not a generic set of characteristics, attitudes, practices, or skills that can be 
fairly attributed to all, or almost all, people who are or have been bankrupt. 
This last point applies overwhelmingly in the use of bankruptcy 
stigmatisation in employment decision-making generally. However, it may be 
that, for some occupations, or in some licensing regimes, there is a genuine 
relationship between bankruptcy status and the job requirements. The fact that 
bankruptcy statistics show that there is a greater risk of bankruptcy for persons 
who are, or have been, bankrupt, compared to persons who have never been 
bankrupt might also suggest a genuine relevance of bankruptcy for relationships 
(for example, customers, suppliers, clients) where there is a direct contractual 
relationship with a person who is, or has been bankrupt. In any case, however, a 
blanket approach is unlikely to be appropriate, and a more robust policy rationale 
is needed. In the next Part, we discuss some areas where change should be 
considered. 
 
V   SOME INITIAL SUGGESTIONS FOR LAW REFORM 
The above discussion demonstrates that there is a potential for bankruptcy to 
have an adverse impact on the ability to earn an income, whether through 
employment or self-employment. This situation results from the law engaging in 
official labelling, and requiring or facilitating informal labelling of bankrupts as 
deviants. The extent to which such adverse impacts materialise in the Australian 
context is impossible to identify with any certainty. Although research findings in 
the USA suggest that bankruptcy and credit report discrimination in employment 
settings is a real problem, these findings are not necessarily applicable here, 
given the different economic and employment settings of Australia and the USA. 
In addition, the situation in the USA as regards the right of employers to directly 
access credit reports contrasts markedly with the situation in Australia, at least in 
theory. 
                                                 
220  Shepard, ‘Towards A Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117, 1722. See also 
Cordry, who suggests that bankruptcy should only be taken into account if to do so is addressing an 
underlying regulatory problem: Cordry, above n 214, 25–6. 
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Research is therefore needed on the extent to which the potential impacts 
identified in this article manifest in practice, including the extent to which there 
are different impacts for people who enter bankruptcy as a result of consumer 
debts, and people who enter bankruptcy as a result of business debts – the laws 
we have discussed in this article do not make this distinction. 
Even in the absence of empirical evidence on this point, however, there is 
work that is needed to modify the law’s role in labelling, and thus in stigmatising 
bankruptcy, given that there is not strong evidence for a link between bankruptcy 
and poor job performance, or increased propensity for irresponsibility, theft or 
fraud in an employment context. Further, the general stigmatisation of 
bankruptcy, in the context of the specific issues that we have discussed above, 
inhibits the potential for a rehabilitation-focused fresh start. We contend that a 
rehabilitation-focused fresh start should be the approach favoured in Australia, as 
it is more likely to lead to an improved financial wellbeing for former bankrupts. 
We therefore provide some initial suggestions for law reform in this area. 
Rehabilitation is also an important goal in the context of debt agreements and 
personal insolvency agreements under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), and some 
of the suggestions made below will also be relevant to these other 
administrations. 
First, in the case of occupations involving a licensing or registration 
requirement where the government is playing a gatekeeper role, a policy review 
should be undertaken to determine, in a robust manner, the circumstances in 
which there is a genuine policy justification for imposing a restriction to entry on 
the grounds of bankruptcy, and thus a need for official labelling.221 As we have 
demonstrated above, there is currently little by way of explicit policy rationale 
for these restrictions. In addition, there is a level of inconsistency in existing 
occupational bankruptcy restrictions. For example, there are differences between 
occupations on the length of time that bankruptcy can be used to restrict entry to 
a particular occupation, the extent to which bankruptcy either operates as a 
mandatory bar to an occupation, or allows a decision maker to consider the 
‘story’ behind a bankruptcy, and the types of other insolvency administrations 
that also lead to occupational restrictions. Given the many and varied 
circumstances that can lead to bankruptcy, if a restriction should be retained, 
consideration should be given to a preference for discretionary bars, rather than 
mandatory bars, so that the affected person at least has an opportunity to have 
their particular circumstances taken into consideration.222 
The policy review could therefore relevantly consider what might be the 
grounds for extending restrictions to persons who have been discharged from 
bankruptcy, and/or to persons who have entered into alternative insolvency 
administrations. One mechanism for achieving such a review could be through a 
                                                 
221  See, eg, Cordry, above n 214. 
222  Although there is a risk that this results in a lack of certainty for debtors. It also facilitates and entrenches 
a link between certain personal characteristics and bankruptcy, and favours more literate persons, rather 
than more deserving persons, see the discussion in Shepard on this point in relation to job applicants: 
Shephard, ‘Seeking Solutions to Financial History Discrimination, above n 195, 1025–7. 
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reference to the Australian Law Reform Commission, perhaps as part of a wider 
reference on insolvency laws. 
Once a robust policy rationale has been identified, existing restrictions should 
then be reviewed to ensure that they are consistent with the agreed policy 
justification, and amended where they are not. 
Second, there is a need to consider amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 1966 
(Cth) so as to reduce the stigmatisation of bankruptcy, and thus the potential for 
an adverse impact on employment and self-employment. 
One potential reform to consider is to reduce the minimum length of 
bankruptcy. This would have a particular impact on occupational restrictions that 
are imposed only while a person is undischarged, and the obligation to disclose 
bankruptcy status to creditors and persons with whom the undischarged bankrupt 
does business. Reducing the minimum period of bankruptcy would be consistent 
with provisions for early discharge that were in force between 1992 and 2003.223 
Reducing the minimum period of bankruptcy would also be consistent with 
the approach taken in comparable fresh start jurisdictions. For example, in 
England and Wales, bankruptcies are automatically discharged after 12 
months; 224  in Canada, the automatic discharge period is nine months or 21 
                                                 
223  Early discharge provisions in the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (eg ss 149S, 149T) were in place from 1 July 
1992 until 5 May 2003. The memorandum accompanying the Bankruptcy Legislation Amendment Bill 
2001 which repealed them, stated that 
[t]he former Minister for Justice and Customs, Senator Amanda Vanstone, explained the abolition of early 
discharge provisions by saying: “many creditors feel that the possibility of being released from 
bankruptcy after six months does not reflect the serious nature of the decision to become bankrupt.” It was 
also felt that early discharge provisions “discourage debtors from trying to enter formal or informal 
arrangements with their creditors to settle debts, and provide little opportunity for debtors to become 
better financial managers”. Other justifications advanced by the Government for the abolition of the early 
discharge provisions [were]: they were initially intended to apply to those who became bankrupt out of 
misfortune (those with few assets and low incomes) rather than misdeed, but it seems inappropriate to 
thus imply that all those with some assets or income have been guilty of incurring debts in bad faith, and 
they apply in a discriminatory way, by excluding women who have joint debts with, and generally a lower 
income than, their spouse, and thus are disqualified by the 150 per cent rule.  
  Katrine Del Villar, Bills Digest, No 8 of 2001–2002, 25 July 2001, 5–6 (citations omitted). 
224  Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) s 279. An automatic discharge after 12 months was introduced from 1 April 
2004 with an additional option for application for early discharge. However the option for early discharge 
was later repealed for persons who become bankrupt on or after 1 October 2013: Insolvency Service, 
Discharge from Bankruptcy (January 2008) 
<https://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/casehelpmanual/D/DischargeFromBankruptcy.htm>. Further, 
Bankruptcy Restriction Orders (‘BRO’) or Bankruptcy Restriction Undertakings (‘BRU’) were 
introduced by the Enterprise Act 2002 (UK). This was in part ‘to differentiate between culpable and non-
culpable bankrupts’: R3 (Association of Business Recovery Professionals), Redressing the Balance: 
Strengthening the Bankruptcy Process and Recognising Prior Behaviour, 2 <https://www.r3.org.uk/ 
media/documents/policy/policy_papers/personal_insolvency/Redressing_the_balance.pdf>. The R3 report 
also recommends that the standard term of bankruptcy could be increased to three years, and reduced to 
one year for the ‘least culpable’ bankrupt: at 5. 
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months if required to contribute surplus income to the estate;225 in New Zealand, 
bankruptcies are discharged after three years, but an application can be made for 
early discharge;226 and in the United States, Chapter 7 bankruptcies (liquidation 
bankruptcies) are normally discharged within two to three months. 227  Similar 
moves towards shortening the period of bankruptcy are being investigated in 
Ireland where the Minister for Justice has referred a proposal to cut the term  
from three years to one year to a formal committee.228 In Germany, legislation 
shortening residual debt discharge proceedings and strengthening the rights of 
creditors 229  was introduced from mid-2014. Although there is not yet a  
uniform approach to consumer bankruptcies in Europe, a 2014 European 
Commission Recommendation suggests that, for entrepreneurs at least, discharge 
should be available after no more than three years.230 However, it is noteworthy 
that the notion of fresh-start is not universal, for example, in Lithuania where 
bankruptcy of natural persons is not available. 231  Reducing the minimum  
period of bankruptcy was also suggested in a discussion paper released  
by the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department in 2009, 232  and was 
recommended in a draft report by the Productivity Commission in May 2015.233 
As King notes ‘Australia is the only country’ in the countries he surveyed, ‘to 
have substantially reduced and then increased its discharge period.’234 
Another potential reform would be to amend the arrangements governing the 
NPII, so that it no longer operates as a permanent public record. While it may be 
appropriate that bankruptcy remain a public record for some period of time, it is 
                                                 
225  Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, c B-3, s 169. See also Bankruptcy Canada, Your Bankruptcy 
Discharge (2015) <http://bankruptcy-canada.com/how-to-file-bankruptcy-canada/bankruptcy-
discharge/>; Stephanie Ben-Ishai, Saul Schwartz and Thomas G W Telfer, ‘A Retrospective on the 
Canadian Bankruptcy System: 40 Years after the Tassé Report’ (2011) 51 Canadian Business Law 
Journal 236, 251. 
226  Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ) s 29. Under s 294, a bankrupt may apply to court for an earlier discharge.  
227  Porter and Thorne, above n 135, 76. ‘In most cases, unless a party in interest files a complaint objecting 
to the discharge or a motion to extend the time to object, the bankruptcy court will issue a discharge order 
relatively early in the case – generally, 60 to 90 days after the date first set for the meeting of creditors’: 
United States Courts, Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics citing Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 
4004(c) <http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter7.aspx>. 
228  Fiach Kelly and Harry McGee, ‘Plan to Cut Bankruptcy Term Referred to Committee’, The Irish Times, 
(Dublin), 12 May 2015. 
229  On the legislation, Gesetz zur Verkürzung des Restschuldbefreiungsverfahrens und zur Stärkung der 
Gläubigerrechte 2013, see Dokumentations-und Informationssytem, Deutscher Bundestag (1 July 2014) 
<http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/467/46749.html>.  
230  European Commission, Commission Recommendation of 12 March 2014 on a New Approach to Business 
Failure and Insolvency (Commission Recommendation, 12 March 2014) Part IV. 
231  Edita Gruodyte and Julija Kirsiene, ‘Application of “Fresh Start” Doctrine for Individual Debtors in 
Lithuania: EU and US perspective’ (2010) 21 Engineering Economics 263. For a discussion of French 
law, see Régis Blazy et al, ‘Personal Bankruptcy Law, Fresh Starts, and Judicial Practice’ (Research 
Report, 2011) <http://economix.fr/pdf/workshops/2011_faillites/CHOPARD_Journees_Faillite_ 
2011.pdf>. 
232  Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Proposed Amendments to the Bankruptcy Act 1966’ (Discussion Paper, 
28 May 2009) 2. Copy on file with the authors. It is not clear how widely this document was circulated. 
233  Productivity Commission, above n 24, 322 (Recommendation 13.1). 
234  King, above n 7, 657. 
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not clear that such records should be permanently publicly accessible without 
restrictions. A suggestion that there may be merit in reducing the length of time 
that bankruptcies and other insolvency administrations are recorded on the NPII 
was mentioned in a 2009 discussion paper released by the Attorney-General’s 
Department, with the suggestion being made that the current situation with 
respect to the NPII ‘appears contrary to the “fresh start” which bankruptcy is 
supposed to deliver to the debtor’.235 However, neither the former Government 
nor the current Government have indicated any policy to change the NPII 
arrangements. Reducing the length of time that insolvency information can be 
accessed on the NPII would also be consistent with the approach in New Zealand 
where bankruptcies are removed from the public register four years after the 
person has been discharged from bankruptcy.236 
An alternative to reducing the permanent nature of NPII records would be to 
restrict the circumstances in which access to a NPII will be granted. 
Finally, the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) could be amended by changing some 
of the language surrounding bankruptcy. For example, changing the language to 
refer to ‘debtors’, rather than ‘bankrupts’, and doing away with the concept of an 
‘act of bankruptcy’ could have the result of decreasing the incidence of informal 
labelling and bankruptcy stigma. 
Third, consideration should be given to the need for a prohibition on 
discrimination against bankrupts or former bankrupts on the grounds of their 
bankruptcy in employment settings, except where the employer can demonstrate 
that there is a robust policy rationale for the discrimination.237 This would have 
the effect of not permitting any stigmatisation of bankruptcy to be acted upon in 
an employment setting, reducing the scope for informal labelling, and reduce the 
potential for bankruptcy to have an adverse effect on employment and the ability 
to earn an income.238 Such a move would be consistent with trends in the USA at 
both federal and state levels,239 and would also be consistent with the proscription 
in Australia against employers directly accessing consumer credit reports. 
                                                 
235  Attorney-General’s Department, above n 232, 3. It may also be relevant to consider whether the NPII 
requirements should be different for debt agreements and personal insolvency agreements, eg, through 
having a shorter retention period than bankruptcy. 
236  Insolvency Act 2006 (NZ) s 449(4). 
237  In the United States, s 525 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 USC (2013) is designed to protect debtors against 
employment discrimination by (a) government units or (b) private employers because of bankruptcy. For 
critiques of these provisions, see Cordry, above n 214, and McPherson, above n 208. 
238  For further arguments in favour of a robust anti-discrimination law, see generally Shepard, ‘Towards A 
Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm’, above n 117; Earle, Madek and Missirian, above n 
211; Gallagher, above n 211. Note, however, that Shepard has more recently suggested that, in light of 
the practical problems with anti-discrimination laws, an alternative would be to develop a robust ‘score’ 
that could be used by employers as a means of identifying persons who are more likely to exhibit 
personal characteristics relevant to the workplace: Shepard, ‘Seeking Solutions to Financial History 
Discrimination’, above n 195, 1035. 
239  Bob Lawless, ‘The Evidence on Pre-employment Credit Checks’ on Bob Lawless et al, Credit Slips: A 
Discussion on Credit, Finance, and Bankruptcy (2 January 2014) <http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/ 
2014/01/the-evidence-on-pre-employment-credit-checks.html>.  
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These suggestions are a starting point only, and any proposals for reform 
would need to consider the full context, including the extent to which proposals 
would help or hinder other objectives of the bankruptcy system, and the 
practicalities of development and implementation, particularly for proposals that 
would require the involvement of multiple governments and/or agencies. 
However, we believe that there is considerable merit in commencing a discussion 
about possible reforms. 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
This article has investigated the extent to which Australian laws; regulations; 
and professional and licensing rules reinforce the stigma associated with 
bankruptcy and so affect the prospects of bankrupts and former bankrupts 
engaging in the workforce and becoming independent economic actors, 
minimising the impact of their fall from financial grace upon society and the 
economy. 
Following a brief review of the insights by sociologists into stigma, we have 
identified some of the ways in which it is observed in respect of the discreditable 
stigma of being or having been a bankrupt. There are clear examples where being 
labelled either officially or informally as a bankrupt facilitates stigmatisation 
when seeking employment or similarly engaging in work. We have posited 
arguments as to why the reinforcement of bankruptcy stigma matters and can 
adversely affect, for inadequately stated policy reasons, the negative 
characteristics associated with being a current or former bankrupt. And we 
concluded with some initial suggestions for law reform in order to promote the 
fresh start objective of Australia’s bankruptcy system as well as its wider 
rehabilitative effect and so increase the likelihood of a former bankrupt re-
engaging as an economic actor in Australian society, and improving their 
financial wellbeing. 
 
 
